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Abstract
International Transfer Pricing in a Developing Economy Context:
Perspectives from the Taxpayers and the Tax Authorities
by
Lo Wai Yee Agnes
Doctor of Philosophy

Since the 1979 economic reforms, China has been characterized by a rapid
increase in international trade and an inflow of foreign direct investment. Foreign
investment enterprises (FIEs) play an increasing important role in the Chinese
economy and are substantially engaged in transactions with affiliates outside China.
Therefore, international transfer pricing in China has become a significant issue.
Empirical research on international transfer pricing has focused on
multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in developed countries. However, it is
difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs operating in developing countries as
the business environment of developing countries is quite different from that of
developed countries. Existing literature identifies that due to differences in the
business environment between developed and developing countries, the tax factors
which are important in developed countries should not be over-emphasized in
developing countries. Some nontax factors such as foreign exchange control and
restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be important in developed countries
are nevertheless important in developing countries. However, empirical studies on
international transfer pricing in developing countries are relatively scare.
Furthermore, there have been no empirical studies that examine the relationships
between management’s perception of the importance of environmental variables and
management’s choice of international transfer pricing methods in developing
countries, or which analyze the tax and nontax cost trade-off for tax evasion via
international transfer pricing in developed or developing countries.
The objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive empirical study on
international transfer pricing in China from the perspectives of both taxpayer and the
tax authority. The results of this thesis indicate that the more important the
management perceives the interest of local partners and the maintenance of a good
relationship with host government to be, the more likely it is that the FIE will adopt a

market-based transfer pricing method. On the other hand, the more important the
management perceives foreign exchange controls in transfer pricing decisions to be,
the more likely it is that the FIE will choose a cost-based transfer pricing method.
The research results also reveal that based on a tax and non-tax cost trade-off
analysis, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and exportoriented FIEs are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits in China than
equity joint ventures and domestic -market oriented enterprises. Some explanations
for this result are the lack of monitoring by Chinese local partners in certain FIEs and
the opportunity for transfer pricing manipulations.
The results of this thesis have important policy implications for foreign investors
carrying on business in China, the Chinese tax authorities as well as academic
researchers. My research results should help foreign investors to have a better
understanding of the tax and the nontax factors in formulating transfer pricing
policies in China. The results should also help tax authorities tackle tax audit
problems more effectively and in setting tax audit guidelines on related party
transactions. Further, this thesis should contribute to the establishment of a more
comprehensive theoretical framework of international transfer pricing in developing
countries. It also empirically demonstrates the applicability of the tax and nontax
cost theory in the context of international transfer pricing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER SUMMARY
As the world economy becomes more globalized, transfer pricing has become
increasingly challenging to multinational corporations in planning and implementing
their global operations. The growth of the Chinese economy is characterized by
rapid increases in inflows of foreign investment and international trade. For many
years, China has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among
developing countries. China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in late
2001 has further accelerated the trend of inflows of foreign investment. In 2002,
China became the second largest recipient of FDI in the world. This situation is
likely to persist in 2003. Also, in 2002, China has become the number four trading
nation in the world, just behind the US, Japan and Germany. Foreign investment
enterprises (FIEs) which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreignowned enterprises play an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy and
trade. They are substantially engaged in transactions with affiliates outside China.
Therefore, international transfer pricing in China has become a significant issue. In
recent years, a large number of these FIEs have reported accounting losses, which
prompted the Chinese government to examine potential transfer pricing a buses.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH

1.1.1

Importance of International Transfer Pricing
International transfer pricing is the pricing of goods, services or intangibles

that are transferred between members of the same group that cross national
boundaries (Elliott and Emmanuel 2000). Inter-affiliate trades include exports and
imports of raw materials, products and capital equipment, transfer of proprietary
technology, royalties for the use of trademarks or copyrights, provision of technical
and management services, and inter-affiliate financing.

As the world economy

becomes more globalized, transfer pricing has become increasingly challenging to
multinational corporations (MNCs) in planning and implementing their global
operations. A survey of accounting educators by Sands and Pragasam (1997) finds
that transfer pricing is ranked as one of the most important topics in international
accounting. Another survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2001) finds that transfer
pricing is rated by MNCs as the most important international tax issue.
Under relevant laws and regulations, prices for related-party transactions
should be set according to comparable market prices similar to other arm’s length
transactions. However, in practice, MNCs treat interna tional transfer pricing as a
mechanism to manoeuvre funds internationally and to choose the countries in which
they wish profits to be reported (Chan and Chow 1997a). They strategically select
transfer prices so as to maximize global tax savings, minimize operating risks and
circumvent restrictions imposed by host governments.
Transfer pricing manipulation has adverse effects on the jurisdictions where
the MNCs operate (Lall 1973; Natke 1985). Outward income shifting by MNCs
reduces tax revenue of the governments and results in a loss of legitimate share of
2

profits to local shareholders. It deprives local staff of higher remuneration because
of distorted operating results. It can also worsen the foreign exchange situation
which may in turn trigger the government to impose stringent restrictions on imports.
More importantly, low profitability reported by MNCs may deter market entrance of
prospective local competitors and this results in the economy's over-dependence on
MNCs. Transfer pricing problems can also be a threat to the capital market. For
example, Enron used a loophole in transfer pricing disclosure rules to hide for many
years transactions with a major employee-run partnership, called Chewco, whose
eventual disclosure played a large impact in the company’s collapse (Emshwiller
2003). To monitor the transfer pricing practices of MNCs, a great number of fiscal
authorities have enacted regulations and taken increasingly aggressive measures
against tax evasion through transfer pricing manipulation.

1.1.2 Significance of International Transfer Pricing in Developing Economies
The business environment in developing countries is distinctly different from
that in developed countries. The importance of environmental variables for transfer
pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries is perceived
differently by the management of MNCs. Existing literature notes that the
inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing manipulation in developing
countries are stronger than that in developed countries and the threat of fiscal losses
is persistent in less developed countries (Brean 1979; Plasschaert 1985; Al-Eryani
1987). MNCs shift profits from developing countries to circumvent the adverse
impact of relatively stringent regulations on foreign investment imposed by these
governments and to minimize the perceived financial risks of operations in relatively
uncertain environments. Developing countries are also more vulnerable to transfer
pricing manipulation due to inadequacies in their institutional framework and the
3

lack of expertise and resources to monitor the intricacies of this issue. Also, they are
concerned that rigorous audits may drive foreign investors to other jurisdictions.
A few studies attempt to provide empirical evidence on trading statistics to
assess the extent of transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs operating in developing
countries. Lall (1973) finds that, compared with world market prices, MNCs in
Colombia over-price their imports into Colombia by 33 percent to 300 percent in the
pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and electrical
industries. Natke's (1985) study of the import prices of MNCs operating in Brazil
during 1979 reveals that MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the
prices of MNCs' imports also exhibit greater variability. Rahman and Scapens (1986)
investigate the import prices of ten pharmaceutical items in Bangladesh, and find that
MNCs over-price imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and 600 percent.
They conclude that transfer pricing abuse accounts for the low profitability of MNCs'
operations in that country. Chan and Chow (1997a) find that MNCs in China overprice imports and under-price exports in the audio/video equipment, garment, plastic
and chemicals industries.

The above studies provide valuable evidence of an

international transfer pricing problem in emerging economies.

1.1.3

Significance of the Chinese Economy
This research examines the international transfer pricing issue in China. I

chose to look at transfer pricing in China because of that country’s increasing
importance in the world economy and the significant volume of inter-company trade
by MNCs with their affiliated companies there.
Since the 1979 economic reforms, China has outperformed major industrial
countries in terms of growth in real GDP. Table 1.1 summarizes GDP growth rates
in China and other major industrial countries. The average annual growth of China's
4

GDP for 1993-2002 was 9.3 percent, more than four times the average growth of the
G-7 countries. The situation is similar in 2003. China's economy, in terms of total
GDP (purchasing power parity base), is already the second largest in the world,
behind the USA, but ahead of Japan and Germany.
[Insert Table 1.1 here]

China's influence on the world economy can also be seen in the rapid growth
in China's foreign trade. As a result of an average annual growth rate of 19.5 percent
in foreign trade from 1993 to 2002, China was ranked among the world's top 4
trading nations in 2002, representing 5.0 percent of total world trade, as opposed to
15.4 percent for the US, 9.0 percent for Germany and 6.1 percent for Japan (United
Nations 2003). China’s foreign trade is expected to continue to increase rapidly due
to the economic momentum generated from its entry into the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in November 2001. In 2003, China’s foreign trade amounted to
US$851.21 billion, a 37.1 percent growth from 2002. Table 1.2 shows the volume of
China’s foreign trade from 1993 to 2003.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]

Since its entry into the WTO, China lowered the tariff barriers on a broad
range of imports, ranging from agricultural goods to industrial products.

The

average import tariff for industrial products was reduced from 16 percent in 2000 to
12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent by 2005. The average
import tariff for agriculture products was reduced from 21.3 percent in 2000 to 18.9
percent in 2002 and will be reduced to 15.6 percent by 2005. Import tariffs for
vehicles will be reduced from 80-100 percent in 2001 to 25 percent by mid -2006. In
addition, import quotas and license grants applicable to over 400 categories of import
5

products will be phased out by 2005 at the latest.
Apart from the reduction of import barriers, China also provides trading
rights to foreign investors due to its accession to the WTO. Before entering the
WTO, China restricted the trading rights (the right to import and export) of foreign
firms and prohibited them from distributing products by themselves. Under the
WTO agreement, trading rights and distribution services of foreign companies will
be progressively phased in over three years. Thus, all foreign enterprises in China
will be granted the right to trade most products by 2005. They can also import and
distribute products without going through a state -owned enterprise or a middleman
(Panitchpakdi and Clifford 2002). Attributable partly to the reductions in import
tariffs and the gradual provision of trading rights, China’s imports increased by 21.2
percent in 2002 and by 39.9 percent in 2003 while the total imports for the world
only increased by 3.4 percent in 2002. Furthermore, as explained later, foreign
investment in China increased rapidly. Many investors aim to take advantage of low
operating costs in China which enable them to export goods at a more competitive
price to other countries. As a result, China’s exports also increased dramatically in
2002 and 2003 due to the growth of the export of labor -intensive products. Such
upward trends in imports and exports are expected to continue due to the opening of
markets in China under the WTO agreement.
China has recently entered into a free trade agreement with a number of
jurisdictions. In order to facilitate trading between Hong Kong and mainland China,
on 29 June 2003, China and Hong Kong signed the Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement (CEPA). Under the CEPA, no import tariff will be imposed on 273
categories of goods from 1 January 2004 if the goods are of Hong Kong origin.
These 273 categories of goods include electrical and electronic products, plastics,
paper, textiles and clothing, chemical and pharmaceutical products, clocks and
6

watches, jewelry, cosmetics, metal products, and miscellaneous appliances and
accessories. This agreement provides significant cost savings for importing certain
products such as jewelry and cosmetics whose current tariffs range from 18.3 to 35
percent. Therefore, CEPA will further accelerate the increase of imports into China.
Other goods of Hong Kong origin not included in these 273 categories will also
enjoy zero import tariff by 2006. CEPA will benefit not only Hong Kong companies,
but also other foreign investors as they can arrange to carry out certain production
procedures in Hong Kong to enjoy the zero tariff arrangement. Transfer pricing
plays an important role in determining whether there is sufficient local (i.e. Hong
Kong) content to qualify for tariff exemption. China also signed a similar CEPA
with Macau in 2003. For the Asia Pacific region, China and the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a framework agreement in late 2002 which
commits them to establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by 2010 (ASEAN
2002). The establishment of an ASEAN- China Free Trade Area would increase
intra-regional trade and investment.
China has also experienced a sharp rise in the inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) since 1990, a trend that has been accelerated by China’s entrance
into the WTO. Despite a global decline of FDI inflows by 21 percent in 2002, FDI
inflows to China increased by 13 percent and China became the second largest
recipient of FDI in the world in 2002 (Table 1.3). FDI inflows to China reached
US$52.7 billion in 2002, a new record reinforcing its position as the largest recipient
of FDI inflows in the developing world (UNCTC 2003). It was reported that FDI in
China reached US$57 billion in 2003, just behind Luxembourg and the United States
(UNCTAD 2004).
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
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Foreign investment enterprises (FIEs), which include Sino-foreign joint
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China, play an increasingly
important role in China’s foreign trade. Table 1.4 shows that in 2003 total imports
and exports by FIEs were US$231.9 billion and US$240.3 billion respectively, which
represents 56 percent and 55 percent of China’s total imports and exports. Among
these imports and exports, a large proportion of transactions was related-party
transactions where the FIEs in China traded with their overseas affiliated companies.
Chan and Chow (1998) find that 88 percent of the export-oriented FIEs in China
purchased and sold 70 percent or more of their total imports and exports to their
affiliated companies. This means that many MNCs operating in China engage in
substantial related-party transactions. Due to the rapidly increasing investment by
MNCs in China and the significant amount of related-party transactions involved,
transfer pricing is an important issue for the Chinese tax authorities, for MNCs
investing in China and indeed for the world economy.
[Insert Table 1.4 here]

Given the increasing importance of foreign investment in the economy, China
has made remarkable strides in formulating relevant policies and a legislative
framework to attract foreign investment, some of their policies tempt foreign
investors to engage in transfer pricing manipulation. The Chinese tax authorities
estimate that over 80 percent of MNCs operating in China engaged in tax evasion,
and that resulting losses in tax revenue were at least US$3.6 billion in 2002.
Transfer pricing manipulation is the most common method used by MNCs for tax
evasion (PRN 2003). To protect government revenues, transfer pricing audits are
regarded as one of the most important tasks by the State Administration of Taxation
(SAT). Accordingly, the SAT provides guidelines and resources for transfer pricing
8

audits. In 2001, the Chinese tax authorities adjusted and increased FIE assessable
profits by a total of US$49 million due to transfer pricing manipulation, which was
more than half of the total amount adjusted for the previous five years combined
(Chinese Tax News 2002). Since China entered the WTO in 2001, tariff rates have
also been rapidly reduced, resulting in a significant decline in government tariff
revenue. The SAT aims to increase their efforts on transfer pricing audits to collect
more escaped tax to partly compensate for this loss of tariff revenues. Therefore,
transfer pricing audits have become a significant issue for both the Chinese tax
authorities and the MNCs in China.

1.2

OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS
This thesis investigates the international transfer pricing issue from both the

taxpayer and the tax authority perspectives. First, I conduct a literature review and
study the institutional framework of transfer pricing in China. Second, I investigate
the

association

between

management's

perception

of

the

importance

of

environmental variables (including tax and nontax factors) and management’s choice
of international transfer pricing methods in China. This part of the research is based
on field interviews of management of MNCs in China. This is a significant issue
given the large amount of investment flowing to China and other developing
countries and the amount of foreign exchange that occurs through foreign investment
in these countries. Third, I evaluate how nontax factors are being considered against
tax factors and influence MNCs’ decisions on profit shifting through transfer pricing
manipulation. I then proceed to investigate empirically via multivariate statistical
analysis the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of being
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities.

Based on an

analysis of tax and nontax costs for firms with different characteristics, I hypothesize
9

that certain types of enterprise are more likely to be audited given China’s
institutional framework, regulations, and business environment.

To test the

hypotheses, I examine the likelihood of an international transfer pricing audit for a
random sample of FIEs in China. These FIEs include those actually being audited on
transfer pricing by Chinese tax authorities and FIEs which have significant interaffiliate transfers but have not been audited.
The results of this paper should have significant implications for tax
authorities as well as for foreign investors operating in China and other developing
economies. By examining the environmental characteristics pertaining to China, this
study sheds empirical light on how the management perception of these
characteristics influences the choice of transfer pricing methods. The findings of this
study are of particular relevance to public policy makers and investors in developing
countries in enhancing their understanding of environmental influences on transfer
pricing decisions , and thus contribute to the building of a more comprehensive
theoretical framework of transfer pricing in developing economies.
The analysis of tax audit cases should he lp tax authorities tackle the tax audit
problems more effectively and set transfer pricing auditing guidelines for relatedparty transactions. For example, given low nontax costs of shifting profits out of
China by export-oriented FIEs, tax authorities could prioritize investigation of this
type of FIE. My research results should also help foreign investors gain a better
understanding of tax and nontax costs for transfer pricing manipulation in China.
Empirical studies on tax compliance are rare due to difficulty in data collection. As
this is the first empirical study of tax and nontax cost trade-offs in an international
transfer pricing and tax audit context, the results provide academic researchers with
an interesting perspective in studying the effect of nontax costs on transfer pricing
manipulation and tax audits. Finally, although China is unique in terms of its size
10

and history, it is in essence a developing economy according to the IMF (2003).
Thus, the research results should provide a useful reference for other developing
countries. For example, countries that have similar forms of investment as China can
make reference to how different types of investment affect transfer pricing
compliance.

1.3

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
In the next chapter, I review the relevant literature. Aspects of the business

environment in China which relate to international transfer pricing and current
transfer pricing regulations are explained and discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
examines the relationship between management perceptions of the importance of
various environmental variables and the transfer pricing methods used by analyzing
the results of an interview survey with management of MNCs in China. Chapter 5
discusses the tax and nontax cost trade -off theory and examines how Chinese tax
authorities implement international transfer pricing legislation.

Relationships

between firm characteristics and the probability of being selected for transfer pricing
audits by Chinese tax authorities are also analyzed in depth in that chapter. Finally,
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the research findings as well as an analysis of the
limitations and future research implications.

11

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Empirical research on international transfer pricing has focused on MNCs operating
in developed countries. However, it is difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs
operating in developing countries as the business environment of developing
countries is quite different from that of developed countries. Existing literature
reveals that due to differences in the business environment between developed and
developing countries, tax factors which are important for developed countries should
not be over-emphasized for developing countries. Some nontax factor s such as
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be
important in developed countries are nevertheless important in developing countries.
Therefore, empirical studies in developing countries that examine the effect of the
perceived importance of environmental variables on transfer pricing decisions, and
the trade-off between tax and nontax factors on transfer pricing decisions can
enhance our understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing behavior in developing
economies.

12

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

INTRODUCTION
Empirical research on international transfer pricing focus on multinational

corporations (MNCs) operating in US, Japan and other developed countries. Much
of the research investigates the effects of environmental variables on transfer pricing
decisions. However, the business environment in developing countries is distinctly
different from that in developed countries. Thus, the importance of environmental
variables for transfer pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries
is perceived differently by the management of MNCs. I will first discuss prior
international transfer pricing research on the importance of environmental variables
in developed and developing countries. Then, I will discuss prior empirical research
on tax compliance. Finally, I will summarize prior studies on the tax and nontax cost
trade-off theory.

2.2

PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFER PRICING IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
Empirical studies on transfer pricing mainly f ocus on developed countries and

much of these prior studies examined the relative importance of environmental
variables that constitute market imperfections to the choice of transfer pricing
methods. Most of these studies surveyed MNCs operating in the US (Tang and Chan
1979; Burns 1980; Borkowski 1992, 1997a, 1997b; Tang 1993, 2002). A few studies
surveyed MNCs in other developed countries including Japan (Tang and Chan 1979;
Borkowski 1997a ), UK (Tang 1981; Mostafa et al. 1984) and Canada (Tang 1981;
Borkowski 1997b).

Other studies deal with MNCs’ income shifting behavior

through international transfer pricing (Klassen et al. 1993; Jacob 1996; Oyelere and

13

Emmanuel 1998; Conover and Nichols 2000), transfer pricing objectives (Cravens
and Shearon 1996), and transfer pricing methods (Kachelmeier and Towry 2002).

Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1981, 1993, 2002)
Tang and Chan (1979) determine the important environmental variables
considered by large US and Japanese MNCs in formulating their transfer pricing
policies. They also identify the environmental variables which discriminate between
US and Japanese MNCs on international transfer pricing practices. By analyzing the
results of their questionnaire survey provided by 76 and 50 large industrial
corporations in the United States and Japan, they find that overall profit to the
company, restrictions on profit remittances imposed by host countries, competitive
position of foreign subsidiaries, differentials in income tax rates and income tax
legislation among countries, and performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries are
the five most important variables rated by US firms. On the other hand, overall
profit to the company, competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, devaluation and
revaluation of foreign currencies, restrictions on repatriation of profits imposed by
foreign countries and performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries are rated as
most important variables by Japanese firms. They find that interest of local partners,
devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies, anti-dumping legislation, import
restrictions imposed by foreign countries, and differentials in income tax rates and
income tax legislation among countries contribute most to the different perceptions
between the rating of US and Japanese firms.
Tang (1981) discusses the similarities and differences among four national
groups of MNCs (the US, Japan, Canada, and the UK) in their consideration of
environmental variables for transfer pricing decisions.

Their results show that

overall profits to the company and the competitive position of subsidiaries in foreign
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countries are considered the most important variables by all four national groups.
The interest of local partners in foreign subsidiaries is ranked substantially higher by
UK and Japanese companies than by Canadian and US companies. Compared with
the other national groups, Japanese companies place significantly greater importance
on the devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies.
Tang (1993) finds that overall profit to the company is still the most
important environmental variable for US MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions.
Compared with Tang (1979), management ranked differentials in income tax rates
and income tax legislation among countries, maintaining good relationships with host
governments, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek local funds, and
antitrust legislation of foreign countries as more important to transfer pricing
decisions.
Tang (2002) updates Tang (1993). Some environmental variables us ed in
Tang (1993) are replaced by new environmental variables in Tang’s (2002) study.
For example, the old variable “differentials in income tax rates and income tax
legislation among countries” is not used, and new variables including “transfer
pricing and other tax regulations in the United States”, “transfer pricing and other tax
regulations of foreign countries”, and “differentials in income tax rates among
countries” are added. The results of the study show that transfer pricing and other
tax regulations in the United States is the most important variable for transfer pricing
decisions, followed by overall profit to the company.

Burns (1980)
Burns (1980) aims to find the extent to which firms’ transfer pricing
decisions are influenced by various environmental factors.

He analyses the

responses from financial executives of 62 US-based MNCs. The financial executives
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were asked to rate the importance of each environmental variable on their firms’
transfer pricing decisions and to select five environmental variables which are most
important to their firms’ transfer pricing decisions. The results show that market
conditions in foreign countries, competition in foreign countries, reasonable profit
for foreign affiliates, US federal income taxes, and economic conditions in foreign
countries are rated as the five most important variables among the others.

Mostafa et al. (1984)
Mostafa et al. (1984) use discriminant analysis to test whether the
environmental variables including overall profit of the company, divisional
autonomy, and compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations would affect the
choice of transfer pricing methods by MNCs. The paper collects data from 46 UK
companies using a questionnaire survey.

The results show that the perceived

importance of the variables, including overall profit of the company, divisional
autonomy, compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations, and performance
evaluation of divisions, are significantly related to the international transfer pricing
methods used. However, the study does not rank the importance of each variable on
the transfer pricing decision, nor does it test the relationship between the transfer
pricing methods used and the environmental variables individually.

Borkowski (1992, 1997a, 1997b)
Borkowski (1992) studies the organizational and environmental variables that
affect transfer pricing decisions through a questionnaire survey for 247 US-based
MNCs. Findings suggest that the choice of a transfer pricing method is affected by
specific organizational and environmental characteristics, including ease and cost of
implementation, use of subsidiary profit as the primary performance evaluation
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measure, degree of decentralization in the MNC, tax and tariff regulations, and the
economic sta bility of the parent MNC country. The results also show that stability
and favourableness of the parent company’s economic circumstances are significant
environmental factors affecting transfer pricing decisions.
Borkowski (1997a) attempts to determine whether organizational factors,
environmental factors, and financial factors affect the choice of transfer pricing
methods using univariate tests.

A questionnaire survey collected data from 39

Japanese MNCs and 28 US MNCs. Findings suggest that Japanese and US MNCs
utilize different transfer pricing methods, where Japanese MNCs are more likely to
use non-cost-based methods than the US MNCs. Findings also suggest that the
choice of transfer pricing methods is affected by differences in environmental
(including the risk of audits by tax authorities and the market conditions in subsidiary
countries) and financial factors (including return on equity and return on assets), but
not by organizational factors (including industry and performance evaluation criteria).
Environmental variables have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing
methods.
Borkowski (1997b) analyzes the importance of environmental factors on
transfer pricing decisions using similar statistical methods as Borkowski (1997a).
Her sample includes 28 Canadian MNCs with US subsidiaries and 62 US MNCs
with Canadian subsidiaries. The findings suggest that Canadian and US MNCs have
similar views on the importance of different environmental variables on transfer
pricing decisions, and “economic conditions of Canada” and “risk of audits by US
tax authorities” are significant factors affecting the choice of transfer pricing
methods.

Klassen et al (1993)
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Klassen et al. (1993) evaluate changes in the reporting of taxable income by
US MNCs in response to the changes in income tax rates. They analyze accounting
data of 191 US MNCs and find evidence of income shifting by MNCs in response to
tax rate changes in Canada, Europe and the US. They find that with increasing
Canadian tax rates, MNCs shift income to the United States from Canada, whereas
with decreasing rates in Europe, they shift income to Europe from the United States.

Cravens and Shearon (1996)
Cravens and Shearon (1996) examine whether transfer pricing policies affect
financial consequences by using 82 responses to a questionnaire survey of US MNCs.
They find that the number of countries of operation and the dollar value of transfers
are significant factors that explain the total tax burden of MNCs. They also find that
the value of transfers and the foreign sales percentage have an effect on the financial
outcomes of the firm as measured by return of assets.

Jacob (1996)
Jacob (1996) investigates the relationships between the volume of intrafirm
sales, differential tax rates and tax payments. He collects data from annual reports of
260 US firms from 1982 to 1984 and 289 firms from 1988 to 1990. He finds that
firms with substantial intrafirm transfers paid lower global taxes, lower US taxes in
the period of 1982-1984 (i.e. when foreign tax rates were lower than US tax rates)
and higher US taxes in the period of 1988-1990 (i.e. when US tax rates were lower
than foreign tax rates). These results are consistent with his hypotheses.

Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998)
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Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) examine the possible use of international
transfer pricing as an income shifting mechanism by foreign-controlled enterprises
operating in the UK. They compare the profitability and dividend distributions of a
sample of 36 foreign-controlled enterprises and 36 UK-controlled enterprises over a
two-year period.

They find that foreign-controlled enterprises have lower

profitability and higher dividend distribution than UK-controlled enterprises. This
provides evidence that foreign-controlled enterprises in the UK shift income through
international transfer pricing.

Conover and Nichols (2000)
Conover and Nichols (2000) evaluate the effect of firm size on income
shifting between tax jurisdictions through the use of transfer prices both before and
after the passage of the US Tax Reform Act of 1986. They expand the sample of
Jacob (1996) by including 127 additional observations in the pre -1986 period and
136 additional observations in the post-1986 period. By doing so, their study extends
prior studies by including smaller and financially distressed firms in the sample.
They find that smaller and financially distressed firms are less likely to shift income
through transfer pricing than larger firms.

Kachelmeier and Towry (2002)
Prior study reveals that transfer price negotiators expect fairness -based price
concessions that moderate the influence of an outside market price when the outside
market price strongly favors one of the parties. Based on an experimental study,
Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) examine whether the expectations of fairness-based
price concessions extend to the actual prices that result from real-cash negotiation.
They find that expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual
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negotiations when participants negotiate over a computer network with no
communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances.

Conversely, both

expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions
when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting with unrestricted communication.

In conclusion, prior studies in developed countries find that environmental
variables have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods.
Differentials in income tax rates, income tax and transfer pricing regulations among
countries, and competition in foreign countries are ranked as important
environmental variables for transfer pricing decisions.

Other studies detect

significant income shifting due to tax rate changes and other tax considerations as
well as the volume of transfer. Transfer pricing may also be affected by the nature of
negotiations.

Key aspects of the above studies are summarized in Table 2.1.

However, it is difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs operating in developing
countries, as the business environment of developing countries is quite different from
that of developed countries. For example, more stringent rules on movement of
capital, and higher financial and political risks of operations are typically expected in
developing countries.
[Insert Table 2.1 here]

2.3

PRIOR INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
The business environment in developing countries is distinctly different from

that in developed countries. Thus, the importance of environmental variable s for
transfer pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries is perceived
differently by the management of MNCs.
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Existing literature notes that the

inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing manipulation in developing
countries are stronger than in developed countries and the threat of fiscal losses is
persistent in less developed countries.

Lall (1973), Natke (1985), Rahman and Scapens (1986), Chan and Chow (1997a)
Some studies attempt to use empirical evidence on trading statistics to assess
the extent of manipulation of transfer pricing by MNCs operating in developing
countries. Lall (1973) finds that, compared with world market prices, MNCs in
Colombia over-priced their imports by 33 percent to 300 percent in the
pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and electrical
industries. Natke's (1985) study of the import prices of MNCs operating in Brazil
during 1979 reveals that MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the
prices of MNCs' imports also exhibit greater variability. Rahman and Scapens (1986)
investigate the import prices of ten pharmaceutical items in Bangladesh, and find that
MNCs over-priced imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and 600 percent.
They conclude that transfer pricing abuse accounts for the low profitability of MNCs'
operations in that country. Chan and Chow (1997a) find that MNCs in China overpriced imports and under-priced exports in the audio/video equipment, garment,
plastic and chemicals industries. The above studies provide valuable evidence of
international transfer pricing problems in emerging economies.

Kim and Miller (1979), Plasschaert (1985)
Limited studies investigate the effect of environmental variables on transfer
pricing decisions of MNCs in developing countries. Kim and Miller (1979) collect
survey and interview data from 30 US parent firms with at least one subsidiary in
two of the eight specified developing countries (i.e. Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
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Taiwan, Brazil, Colombia, Me xico and Peru). Each of the firms is asked to indicate
the degree of importance they attached to the nine factors which have potential
influence on transfer pricing decisions. The results show that profit repatriation
restrictions and exchange control within the foreign subsidiary country are most
important for transfer pricing decisions in these developing countries.

The tax

variables, that is, income tax liability within the host country and within the US,
which are important for MNCs in developed countries, only rank fifth and the sixth
in the developing countries.
Another transfer pricing study in developing countries, Plasschaert (1985),
aims to explore whether policies and regulations in less developed countries are such
that the temptations for the MNCs to practice transfer pricing manipulation are
stronger than is the case in more developed countries. Based on his analysis, less
developed countries typically impose more restrictions on the MNCs than is the case
in more developed countries. Import duties and exchange controls are also important
environmental variables to induce transfer pricing manipulation in less developed
countries. Moreover, less developed countries generally operate fewer measures to
uncover and to redress transfer pricing manipulation since they are less well
equipped for the task. Therefore, inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing
manipulation in developing countries are stronger than in developed countries.
MNCs would shift profits from developing countries to circumvent the adverse
impact of relatively stringent regulations on foreign investment imposed by
governments and to minimize the perceived financial risk of operations in relatively
uncertain environments. Table 2.2 summarizes prior international transfer pricing
research in developing economies.
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
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Both Kim and Miller (1979) and Plasschaert (1985) find that due to
differences in business environment between developed and developing countries,
tax factors which are important in deve loped countries are not so important in
developing countries. Some nontax factors such as foreign exchange control and
restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be important in developed countries
are perceived as important factors in developing countries. However, Kim and
Miller (1979) did not test how the importance of environmental variables affects the
choice of transfer pricing methods.

They also ignore the trade-off between

environmental variables when making transfer pricing decisions. Plasschaert (1985)
provides a good analysis but does not provide empirical evidence on how the
environmental variables affect the transfer pricing decisions in developing countries.
Therefore, empirical studies in developing countries examining the effect of the
perceived importance of environmental variables on transfer pricing decisions, and
examining the trade-off between tax and nontax factors on transfer pricing decisions
can enhance our understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing behavior in developing
economies.

2.4

PRIOR RESEARCH ON TAX COMPLIANCE
The empirical research of tax compliance is limited due to the difficulty in

data collection. Compliance research mostly employs the judgment and decisionmaking paradigm, but also includes some analytical and archival-empirical studies.
The research in this area is concerned with what factors determine compliance with
the tax code (Shevlin 1999).

Mills (1998)
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Mills (1998) uses data from tax returns and tax audit results for both private
and public firms to test whether firms can manage tax and financial accounting
income separately (i.e. no trade-off between tax and financial reporting). Mills (1998)
finds that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed audit adjustments increase as the
excess of book income over taxable income increases. The implication here is that
the larger the book-tax difference, the larger the tax evasion and the corresponding
IRS audit adjustment. The paper provides evidence that firms cannot costlessly
maximize financial reportin g benefits and tax savings independently. This evidence
justifies the general assumption in financial accounting research that firms face a
trade-off between book and tax incentives for reporting income. Thus, firms cannot
manage tax and financial accounting income separately and cannot have an unlimited
level of book-tax differences because the larger the book-tax difference, the higher
the risk of audit adjustment made by IRS. Therefore, researchers can use financial
information to estimate tax-complia nce behavior.

Chan and Mo (2000, 2002)
Chan and Mo (2000) study the tax compliance issue in China. Under tax
incentives, production FIEs with operation period of more than ten years can enjoy a
tax holiday (i.e. FIEs are exempted from tax for first two profit-making years and
have a 50% tax reduction in the following three years).

Chan and Mo (2000)

examine corporate noncompliance during tax holidays by analyzing 585 audit cases
in China. They find that a company’s tax-holiday position affects noncompliance.
Companies are least compliant before entering a tax holiday because FIEs have
incentives to exaggerate losses during the pre -holiday period to delay the start of the
tax holiday. They also find that companies are most compliant while in the tax-
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exemption period because FIEs do not have an incentive to evade tax since they are
exempted from tax.
Chan and Mo (2002) further decompose the noncompliance into book-tax
conforming and book-tax difference noncompliance, and analyze how company
characteristics differentially affect the incentives and opportunities for different
forms of tax noncompliance (i.e. book-tax-conforming or book-tax-difference).
Based on 256 tax audit cases, they find that export-oriented and high-tech companies
have significantly larger book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments than domesticmarket-oriented and non-high-tech companies. Export-oriented FIEs have special
tax incentives and priority in obtaining loans. Thus, they have greater tax benefits
and lower financial reporting costs of underreporting book and tax incomes. Hightech FIEs have less reliance on reported profits for performance evaluation and
obtaining loans. Thus, they have lower financial reporting costs of underreporting
book and tax incomes.

Domestic-market-oriented and non-high-tech companies

have significantly larger book-tax-difference audit adjustments than their
counterparts, because domestic -market-oriented firms incur large entertainment
expenses for keeping a good relationship with distributors which may exceed the
deduction limit and non-high-tech companies rely more on accounting income than
high-tech companies. However, Chan and Mo (2000, 2002) specifically exclude
transfer pricing noncompliance in their studies as their data were based on China’s
annual tax audits.

Chan and Chow (1997b)
Chan and Chow (1997b) was the first and only empirical study on transfer
pricing noncompliance in China by using the tax audit cases in the early 1990s. By
comparing the firm characteristics of FIEs being selected for transfer pricing audits
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by the Chinese tax authorities and national data, they find that a higher proportion of
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and Hong Kong
sourced FIEs are selected for transfer pricing audits than the national distribution of
FIEs. However, Chan and Chow (1997b) do not provide any multivariate analysis,
nor do they specifically analyze the tax and nontax cost trade-off for the MNCs. As
explained later, they also do not study the effect of activity orientation on transfer
pricing noncompliance. My research extends the Chan and Chow (1997b) study by
analyzing via multivariate statistical methods how firm characteristics, including
activity orientation, affect the incentive for transfer pricing manipulation and the
probability of being audited under the tax and nontax cost trade-off theory. I also
analyze the effects of two important variables (i.e. audit costs and possible tax
amount that can be recovered by tax authorities) on audit selection.

Table 2.3

summarizes prior research on tax compliance.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]

2.5

RESEARCH ON TAX AND NONTAX COST TRADE -OFF THEORY
A growing body of empirical tax research examines the coordination of taxes

and other factors in business decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).

As

discussed, Mills (1998) and Chan and Mo (2002) study the trade-off between tax and
financial statement income through tax audit cases. Other studies on tax and nontax
cost trade-off are summarized below.

Cloyd (1995)
Cloyd (1995) examines the effects of tax and financial accounting conformity
on tax preparers’ recommendations of tax treatment. The author hypothesizes that
when there is ambiguity regarding the tax treatment, conformity or nonconformity of
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the financial accounting treatment affects expected tax benefits of the treatment
through its effect on the subjective probabilities of (i) an IRS audit and (ii)
successfully defending the tax position if challenged by the IRS.
By conducting an experiment with 72 experienced tax professionals as
subjects, Cloyd (1995) finds that (i) conformity of financial accounting and tax
accounting

treatments

increases

tax

preparers’

subjective

probabilities

of

successfully defending aggressive tax positions, and (ii) more preparers
recommende d aggressive tax positions in the presence of book-tax conformity and
when the client is described as aggressive with respect to tax matters. Therefore, the
findings suggest that book-tax conformity reduces the tax cost predicted by tax
preparers.

Cloyd et al. (1996)
Based on a mail survey of corporate financial executives, Cloyd et al. (1996)
examine whether management is more likely to choose conformity when expected
tax savings increase, and is less likely to choose conformity when financial reporting
costs relating to ownership structure increase (i.e. for public firms). They suggest
that if the appropriate financial accounting and tax treatments are ambiguous and the
firm has chosen an aggressive tax treatment, it is likely that management may choose
a financial accounting method that conforms to the tax choice (i.e. conformity) in an
effort to increase the probability that the IRS will allow the tax treatment. However,
despite an expected tax saving, it is unlikely that management always chooses
conformity because the choice results in lower reported income and incurs higher
nontax costs due to the market reactions of the low reported income. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between tax and nontax costs. They find that conformity is more
likely as its effect on successfully defending the aggressive tax position increases,
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and public -firm managers are less likely to conform than are private-firm managers
because public firms have higher financial reporting costs.

Guenther et al. (1997)
Guenther et al. (1997) examine the impact of book-tax conformity on firms’
financial reporting and tax planning activities. Due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
many large publicly traded firms in the US were forced to change from the cash
method of accounting to accrual method of accounting for tax purposes. The change
would increase book-tax conformity because the same method is used for
recognizing income for tax and financial reporting purposes. They investigate the
behavior of the “cash method” firms (i.e. the firms forced by statute to adopt accrual
method from cash method for tax purpose) in reporting their accounting income and
cash flows in the pre - and post-1986 period.
They find that “cash method” firms accrued more income for financial
reporting than “accrual” firms (i.e. the firms used the accrual method for both tax and
financial purposes pre- and post-1986 periods) before the Tax Reform Act because
the year-end acceleration of financial statement income imposed no tax costs if cash
were not collected for the accrued income. However, the “cash method” firms
reduced accruals after the Tax Reform Act. The results indicate that increasing
book-tax conformity (i.e. using accrual method for both tax and financial reporting)
causes firms to defer income recognition for financial statement reporting purposes
(so as to defer tax payment) after considering the trade -off between tax and financial
reporting objectives.

Klassen (1997)
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Klassen (1997) uses inside ownership concentration as a proxy for capital
market pressure.

This study examines whether inside ownership concentration

influences the trade-off between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives,
since financial reporting is an important nontax consideration for many managers
who rely on capital markets to raise investment funds. But at the same time, these
managers may not wish the company to appear as profitable when preparing tax
returns.

The results show that firms with lower levels of inside ownership

concentration realize larger financial reporting gains or smaller financial reporting
losses than firms with higher levels of concentration. Such a relationship is weaker
for low tax-rate firms. Thus, the findings support the hypotheses that lower inside
ownership will lead to increased emphasis on financial reporting, and thus result in
larger realized gains or smaller realized losses. This implies lower inside ownership
firms have lower levels of tax evasion as they are more likely to report larger income
rather than underreport income to reduce tax payments.

Mills and Newberry (2001)
Mills and Newberry (2001) examine whether nontax financial-reporting costs
(such as debt constraints, and bonus plan threshold) influence book-tax conformity
decisions. In particular, this paper conducts empirical tests on the potential influence
of nontax financial-reporting costs for firms with different ownership types (public
vs. private) on firms’ book-tax conformity. They find that public firms report higher
book earnings relative to taxable income than private firms when they are in
profitable positions because public firms have higher financial reporting costs, and
report larger book losses relative to tax losses when they are in loss positions in order
to increase the probability that they can improve their financial results next year. In
addition, Mills and Newberry (2001) find that higher debt levels impose greater
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nontax costs on firms that are privately held or more financially distressed. They
also find that bonus plan thresholds and book income patterns influence public firms’
book-tax reporting.

Public firms have higher nontax financial-reporting costs

because the diffused ownership results in greater reliance on compensation plans that
use reported book income. Public firm managers are more likely to believe that
reported income determines the market values of their firms. Besides, accounting
theory posits that firms subject to greater monitoring by lenders are more likely to
use income -increasing accounting procedures.

Hodder et al. (2003)
After the change of US tax law in 1996, banks are permitted to become Scorporations which can avoid the double tax burden imposed on C-corporations. Ccorporations’ earnings are taxed at the corporate level and dividends are also taxed at
the individua l-shareholder level, whereas S-corporations’ shareholders are taxed
individually but the S-corporations are not taxed at the corporate level and dividends
are tax free. Given the tax benefits, banks are expected to convert to S-corporations.
However, in fact, only 19.2 percent of banks did so by 1999 due to nontax cost
considerations. Hodder et al. (2003) examine tax and nontax factors that influence
commercial banks’ conversion decision from taxable C-corporations to nontaxable Scorporations.
The res ults show that banks are more likely to convert to S-corporations as
the tax benefits of conversion increase (i.e. when conversion saves dividend taxes,
avoids alternative minimum taxes, minimizes state income taxes, and when
conversion causes loss of corporate tax-loss carry forwards and potential penalty
taxes on unrealized gains), and are less likely to convert as the costs of conversion
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increase (i.e. when banks have high demand of capital but conversion causes
restricted access to equity capital).

Smith (2002)
None of the above empirical studies on tax and nontax cost trade-off deal
with transfer pricing. Smith (2002) provides an analytical study on transfer pricing
dealing with the trade -off between tax minimization and managerial performance
evalu ation.

Some studies argue that firms do not face a meaningful trade-off

between tax minimization and performance evaluation because the firms can use
multiple transfer prices to eliminate the trade-off. For example, different transfer
prices can be used for tax and performance evaluation purposes, or performance
measures which are independent of the transfer prices can be used for eliminating the
trade-off between taxes and incentives. Smith (2002) addresses the potential tradeoff between tax minimization and managerial performance evaluation in setting
multinational transfer prices. He analytically proves that the trade -off between tax
and performance evaluation still exists because audit risk will be increased if the
firms (i) set separate transfer prices for tax and performance evaluation or (ii) use a
performance measure other than profit. He finds that the possibility of discovery of a
second price by tax authorities may lead to penalties and additional tax which would
thus limit the value of using separate prices for transfer pricing.

Besides,

sophisticated regulators could correctly infer that income shifting motivates a firm’s
choice of an idiosyncratic, non-profit -based compensation scheme and thus decide to
audit the firm more closely. However, no empirical results are provided in his study.
Table 2.4 summarizes prior research on tax and nontax cost trade-off analysis.
[Insert table 2.4 here]
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In conclusion, my thesis is different from the previous studies on tax and
nontax cost trade-off because I study transfer pricing behavior based on actual tax
audit cases and the “tax and nontax cost trade -off” analysis, whereas the other studies
in this area mainly focus on the trade-off for book-tax reporting decisions with no
specific reference to transfer pricing. Smith (2002) is the only study that addresses
the potential trade-off between tax minimization and managerial performance
evaluation in setting multinational transfer prices. However, no empirical results
were provided in his study.
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CHAPTER 3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION
IN CHINA
CHAPTER SUMMARY
China has recently experienced a sharp increase in the inflow of foreign direct
investment. Hong Kong, the United States, Japan and Taiwan are considered the
four major sources of foreign investment in China. These four jurisdictions account
for 70.1 percent of the total foreign direct investment of China as at the end of 2002.
The business environment in China gives rise to a mixed inducement on MNC’s
transfer pricing decisions. With generous tax incentives, China’s corporate income
tax rates are generally lower than most of the developed countries. However, import
tariffs in China, though declining, are still generally higher compared with its major
trading partners. When setting transfer prices, FIEs will face a trade-off between
minimization of corporate income tax and minimization of import tariffs. In addition,
the foreign exchange control risks and the political risks in China are strong
inducements for FIEs to shift profits out from China through transfer pricing. Other
environmental factors such as interest of local partners and restrictions on
repatriation of profits may also impact international transfer pricing decisions by
MNCs in China. MNCs should also pay attention to transfer pricing legislation in
China. The regulations require all related-party transactions to be at arm’s length
price, otherwise, the tax authorities are empowered to adjust the transfer prices
adopted using methods such as the comparable uncontrolled price method, resaleminus method and cost-plus method.
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CHAPTER 3
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION
IN CHINA
3.1

INTRODUCTION
Transfer pricing is regarded as a mechanism available for MNCs to maximize

profits by exploiting the market imperfections arising from a set of economic and
sociopolitical factors that vary from country to country (Leitch and Barrett, 1992).
Like most developing countries, China offers preferential policies to attract foreign
investment, while at the same time imposing controls on outflows of capital. As
analyzed by Chan and Chow (1997b), the business environment in China gives rise
to mixed inducements affecting MNC’s transfer pricing decisions.

This chapter

reviews various aspects of the business environment in China which is relevant to
international transfer pricing considerations including (i) sources of foreign
investment, (ii) forms of investment, (iii) corporate income tax laws, (iv) import and
export tariffs, (v) foreign exchange control and risks, (vi) repatriation of profits,
royalties, interest and other inter-company charges, and (vii) political and social
pressures.

Finally, transfer pricing regulations in China will be explained and

discussed.

3.2

ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA
Decisions on international transfer pricing are motivated by a number of

environmental factors. Sources of foreign investment and forms of investment affect
the background and structure of management and would thus affect the operations of
FIEs including the setting of transfer pricing policies. Other environmental factors
including corporate income tax laws, import and export tariffs, foreign exchange
control and risks, repatriation of profits, and political and social pressures would
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trigger different costs and benefits for shifting profits through transfer prices. I will
discuss these environmental variables as follows:

3.2.1

Sources of Foreign Investment in China
As elaborated in Chapter 1, China has recently experienced a sharp rise in the

inflow of foreign direct investment. Foreign investment has increased from US$27.5
billion in 1993 to US$46.8 billion in 2001. China’s entrance to the WTO in late
2001 has accelerated the trend of inflows of foreign investment. Foreign direct
investment in China reached US$52.7 billion in 2002 and China became the second
largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world just behind Luxembourg,
but ahead of the United States.
Foreign direct investment in China comes from more than 50 countries or
regions. Hong Kong remains the leading source of foreign direct investment in
China, accounted for 45.7 percent of accumulated FDI during 1979-2002, followed
by investment from the United States which accounted for 8.9 percent of total
contracted investment in those years (SSB 2003). Japan and Taiwan are also major
sources of investment in China. As shown in Table 3.1, these four jurisdictions (i.e.
Hong Kong, the United States, Japan and Taiwan) account for 70.1 percent of the
total foreign direct investment as at the end of 2002. However, it is worth noting that
many Hong Kong companies investing in China are not owned by bona fide Hong
Kong residents (Pomfret 1989; Khan 1991). A number of MNCs invest in China
through their Hong Kong subsidiaries (Plummer and Montes 1995). Some small- and
medium-sized investors from Western countries form joint ventures with Hong Kong
companies to invest in China in order to capture the experience and expertise of these
firms in the China market (Plummer and Montes, 1995). This trend is expected to
continue as China signed The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)
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with Hong Kong in 2003. Under the CEPA, Hong Kong companies are allowed to
establish operations in China for certain restricted sectors including management
consulting, advertising, accounting, distribution, freight forwarding agency, storage
and warehousing, logistics, tourism, audio visual, construction and real estate, legal
services, banking services, securities services, and insurance. Some non-Hong Kong
companies will take advantage of opportunity from CEPA and thus invest in China
through their Hong Kong subsidiaries or through the acquisition of Hong Kong
companies. Unfortunately, no official statistics are available to gauge the magnitude
of the foreign ownership of Hong Kong companies investing in China.
[Insert Table 3.1 here]

3.2.2

Forms of Investment
The Chinese government allows FIEs to operate in China in the form of joint

ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Two types of joint ve nture are in
operation, namely, equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures.
Equity joint ventures (EJVs) are governed by the Law on Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment and must be formed as a limited liability
company. Foreign investors share profits and bear risks in proportion to their equity
ownership. The highest authority of an equity joint venture is the board of directors,
which decides all major issues concerning the joint venture. The board consists of at
least three directors appointed by the partners according to each partner's capital
contributions. In handling major issues, the board of directors reaches decisions
through consultation with the joint venture partners. EJVs are now the most common
form of foreign investment in China as shown in Table 3.2.

An advantage of

investing in the form of EJVs is the benefit of having a Chinese partner equipped
with local market information. However, the participation of local partners restricts
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the freedom of the foreign partners in making business decisions. For example,
when making transfer pricing decisions, foreign partners need to ensure fair profits
are reported by the EJVs in order to avoid conflict with the local partners.
Cooperative joint ventures (CJVs) are governed by the Law on Chineseforeign Cooperative Enterprises. They can be registered as a legal person or a nonlegal one. Their establishment is based on a contract between the venture partners.
Unlike in the EJVs, Chinese and foreign investors are able to contractually specify
their profit-sharing ratios. The management structure for CJVs is also more flexible.
It is usually managed by a management committee comprising representatives from
both partners.

If it is managed by a board of directors, the chairman can be

appointed by either the Chinese or foreign partners. It is also common to have a
management contract granting the foreign partners exclusive authority for running
the venture. CJVs are also more flexible in terms of capital investment requirements
and repayment of capital. In most cases, foreign partners provide machinery, raise
funds and offer management and technical expertise, while Chinese partners provide
land, labor and a network of local contacts. The foreign partners are allowed to
recover their investment during the contractual period. At the expiry of the contract,
the production facility reverts to Chinese partnership without compensation to the
foreign partners. Therefore, transfer pricing is an important mechanism to accelerate
the return of investment to foreign partners. CJVs are popular for projects that have
a limited duration and a specific objective, such as an infrastructure programme.
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) are governed by the Law on
Sole Foreign Investment Enterprises. WFOEs always take the form of a limited
liability company and they are restricted from operating in certain industries such as
telecommunications, utilities and transportation. WFOEs must be export oriented to
achieve a foreign exchange balance or surplus, or they must utilize advanced
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technology to develop new products or improve products that may serve as import
substitutes. However, as China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
trend is to further relax the restrictions on WFOEs. As a result, WFOEs are
becoming popular for foreign investment in China.
Investment options available to foreign investors have been expanding. Since
1995, the Chinese government has allowed large MNCs with multiple ventures in
China to set up Chinese holding companies (CHCs) by uniting their existing projects
and fully integrating the production, marketing, and investment functions under one
corporate roof. The establishment of CHCs can provide foreign investors with ease
of financing while holding their investment interests including EJVs and WFOEs.
CHCs are regarded as foreign entities which hold and invest in second-level FIEs and
provide certain administrative services to their subsidiaries.

Effective from 1

September 2001, foreign invest ors can also set up a new form of business vehicle
called foreign funded venture investment enterprises (FFVIE). FFVIEs can take the
form of WFOE, EJV or CJV. The business scope of FFVIEs include investing in
high and new technology sectors, providing ve nture capital consulting services,
providing management consulting services to their foreign invested enterprises, and
engaging in any other business approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Corporation. However, neither CHCs nor FFVIEs are commonly used in
China.
[Insert table 3.2 here]

3.2.3

Corporate Income Tax
The income tax laws for foreign investment were first enacted in 1980 and

1981, respectively, for joint ventures and foreign enterprises. Under these laws,
different forms of foreign investment were taxed at different rates with different tax
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incentives. In 1991, these laws were unified. All foreign investors in China are taxed
under the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (Income Tax Law). Under the
Income Tax Law, FIEs are liable for income tax based on their income derived from
production and business operations inside and outside China at a rate of 30 percent
plus a local tax of 3 percent, resulting in a total effective rate of 33 percent. However,
a host of tax incentives is offered by the central government to attract or retain
foreign investment, and some of the tax incentives available to FIEs in China are
discussed as follows:

(1)

FIEs can enjoy a reduced tax rate of 15 pecent if their establishments are
located in the five Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou,
Xiamen and Hainan Island) or if they are of a production nature established in
Economic and Technological Development Zones of the fourteen open
coastal cities (Behai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Ninbo,
Shanghai, Nantong, Lianyungang, Qingdao, Yantai, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao
and Dalian). Enterprises of a production nature generally refers to all
manufacturing and agricultural industries and a few servicing industries. The
reduced rate of 15 percent also applies to FIEs engaged in other preferred
projects in some selected areas as approved by the State Council. These
projects are usually related to infrastructure development inc luding energy,
transportation, and port or pier projects.

(2)

FIEs of a production nature established in the five Coastal Open Economic
Zones (Pearl River Deltas, Southern Fujian Province, Changjiang Deltas,
Shangdong Peninsula and Liaodong Peninsula), open cities along the Yangtze
River and in the so-called ‘old urban districts’ of cities where Special
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Economic Zones and Economic and Technological Development Zones are
located can enjoy a reduced tax rate of 24 percent.
(3)

FIEs of a production nature which are scheduled to operate for a period of 10
years or more can enjoy income tax exemption for the first 2 profit-making
years and a 50 percent tax rate reduction for the subsequent 3 years. For
enterprises engaged in low -profit operations and projects in economically
underdeveloped areas, a further reduction of 15 to 30 percent is available for
10 years after the expiration of the 5-year tax holidays.

(4)

Export-oriented FIEs can enjoy a 50 percent tax reduction (subject to a
minimum tax rate of 10 percent) in any particular year which they export
more than 70 percent of their total production (in value terms). Similarly,
technologically advanced FIEs can enjoy a 50 percent tax rate reduction for
an additional 3-year period beyond the normal 5-year tax holiday, so long as
they remain technologically advanced.

(5)

FIEs located in the central western district, which consists of 19 provinces of
inner China and FIEs engaging in businesses categorized as Encouraged
Projects in the Foreign Investment Directive issued by the State Council are
taxed at a reduced rate of 15 percent for the period 2001 - 2010.

The policy of granting extensive tax concessions to foreign investors is
currently under re -consideration by SAT because the WTO requires that there should
be equal conditions for both foreign and domestic investors. The existing policies
governing the granting of tax holidays to FIEs may be completely revamped and may
be replaced by granting tax holidays to companies in certain designated or
encouraged industries, regardless of whether they are FIEs or domestic enterprises.
Incentives previously granted to FIEs may be grandfathered during a transitional
40

period (Mo 2003). It is also anticipated that a new type of enterprise income tax
applicable to both FIEs and domestic enterprises will be introduced in the future to
unify the existing two corporate taxes. A common tax rate of 25 percent for both
FIEs and domestic enterprises has been discussed (Mo 2003).
When setting transfer prices for international related-party transactions, FIEs
will consider the tax rate and tax incentives applicable to them. They can minimize
corporate income tax by shifting profits from high tax jurisdictions to low tax
jurisdictions. For example, an FIE which is taxed at 33 percent in China can shift
profits to its Hong Kong associates (which is taxed at 17.5 percent) through transfer
pricing. If so, for every US$100 transferred, the group can save corporate income
tax of US$15.5. On the other hand, if the FIE is exempt from tax in China, shifting
profits to China through transfer pricing can help the group to save corporate income
tax.

3.2.4

Import and Export Tariffs
The Chinese government has adopted adopts a tariff escalation policy

whereby nominal tariffs vary with the degree of domestic processing. Nominal
tariffs are lower for raw materials and semi-processed materials than for final goods.
Preferential policies are granted to FIEs on import and export tariffs. Machinery and
equipment imported as part of capital from foreign investors in selected industries
are exempt from import tariffs. In addition, the import of raw materials, knock-down
components, parts, accessories and packaging materials for producing export
products is duty free. Goods manufactured by FIEs are also exempt from export
duties. In general, import duties in China are substantially higher than those in more
developed countries. However, since its entry to the WTO, China lowered the tariff
barriers on a broad range of imports, ranging from agricultural goods to industrial
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products. The average import tariff for industrial products was reduced from 16
percent in 2000 to 12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent by
2005. Having said that, the average tariff rate in China is still higher than that in the
United States, Japan and Europe. Therefore, to reduce tariff payments, MNCs can
under -price their goods imported to China. However, by doing so, profits are shifted
to the FIEs in China and this may increase the corporate income tax payment if the
cor porate tax rate in China is higher than the tax rates in the home countries. Thus,
when setting transfer prices, management should consider the potential trade-off
between corporate income tax and tariff payments.
In recent years, China has signed certain free trade agreements with other
jurisdictions which have great impact on China’s tariff system. For the Asian Pacific
region, China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a
framework agreement in late 2002 which commits them to establish an ASEANChina Free Trade Area by 2010 (ASEAN 2002). China also signed the CEPA with
Hong Kong and Macau in 2003. Under the CEPA, no import tariff will be imposed
on 273 categories of goods from 1 January 2004 provided that the goods are of Hong
Kong or Macau origin.

These 273 categories of goods include electrical and

electronic products, plastic articles, paper articles, textiles and clothing, chemical
products, pharmaceutical products, clocks and watches, jewelry, cosmetics, metal
products, and other appliances and accessories. Other goods of Hong Kong or
Macau origin not included in these 273 categories will also enjoy zero import tariff
by 2006. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council estimates that annual savings
in tariffs for Hong Kong, as a result of CEPA and the WTO, will amount to
approximately US$96 million. To enjoy the tariff exemption offered by CEPA,
MNCs may consider relocating some production facilities from other jurisdictions to
Hong Kong or Macau. Transfer pricing is also a major consideration in satisfying
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the criteria of “rule of origin” (i.e. how Chinese government determines the country
of origin for imported products). In order to increase the amount of production in
Hong Kong or Macau, MNCs may reduce their import transfer prices of intermediate
goods by changing the terms of trade. They may also increase the amount of valueadded in Hong Kong and Macau by renaming the terms of production functions. By
manipulating the transfer prices, a higher portion of the production profits can be
reported in Hong Kong or Macau.

3.2.5

Foreign Exchange Control and Risks
China’s foreign exchange policy has been characterized by a high degree of

centralization although China has undergone various reforms for its foreign exchange
system. On 1 January 1994, China unified the official exchange rate with the swap
rate, determined daily by the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China,
through a managed float system. In late 1996, China announced that the Renminbi
can be freely conve rtible for current account items. However, strict control is still
imposed on capital account items. As shown in Table 3.3, the average exchange rate
of Renminbi to US dollars for the past 10 years remained stable within the range
from 8.277 to 8.619.

Many economists agreed that the capital control did help

protect the Renminbi from the currency crisis emerging in Asia during the second
half of 1997 (EIU 1998; CCH 2003).
[Insert Table 3.3 here]

In China, items under the current account are fully convertible. The current
account covers trade and labor service receipts and payments as well as one -way
transfers in foreign exchange. Upon approval by the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE), an FIE can open a foreign exchange settlement account w ith a
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designated bank by presenting its Foreign Exchange Registration Certificate and
other supporting documents. When receiving the foreign exchange, the FIE should
notify SAFE by presenting the foreign exchange receipts on export verification forms,
export declarations, invoices, and foreign exchange receipts on the export
verification counterfoil. FIEs are allowed to go through the verification procedures
on a monthly basis. For foreign exchange received under the current account, FIEs
can retain a certain amount of the foreign exchange received within the limit
prescribed by SAFE. Any excess portion has to be sold to designated banks. When
FIEs have to make external payments within its business scope, they may draw the
required amount from its foreign exchange settlement account and any shortage can
be purchased at designated banks with the supporting documents specified by SAFE.
Unlike the current account, strict control is exerted over the capital account.
The capital account covers foreign exc hange receipts and payments in respect of
direct investment, loans of all kinds, securities investment, etc. In accordance with
the Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People’s Republic of China, all
foreign exchange receipts and payments under the capital account have to be
approved by SAFE. For foreign exchange receipts under the capital account, FIEs
must comply with the relevant regulations and open foreign exchange accounts at
designated banks. For example, for investment capital in foreign exchange
contributed to an FIE, a capital fund account must be opened. The foreign exchange
deposits in the account can be used to pay for current account expenditures as well as
SAFE-approved capital account expenditures.

For external debts and foreign

exchange loans extended by domestic financial institutions in China to an FIE, a loan
account must be opened, and the foreign exchange deposited into this account must
be the contracted amount registered with SAFE. Any withdrawals from this account
must be used for the purposes stipulated in the loan agreements, whereas an approval
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by SAFE is not required. For repayment of loans, SAFE will only approve the
repayment of external debt which has been properly registered. When applying to
SAFE for approva l to make repayment of external debt principal and interest, an FIE
should present proof of external debt registration, the external debt contract, and
notice by creditor on repayment of principal and interest (the notice should state the
respective amounts of principal and interest, interest rate, method of interest
computation, and number of interest -bearing days, etc.). Upon approval by SAFE,
the FIE may make payment through its foreign exchange account or at designated
banks.
The non-convertibility of the Renminbi complicates the investment
environment in China. Foreign exchange control is always a concern for FIEs and
their investors when dealing with China. For example, in practice, it is difficult for
FIEs to obtain foreign exchange to pay off service fees to an overseas company
(CCH 2003). The various ever-changing rules and internal policies made by SAFE
(some of which are not made available to the investors) make foreign exchange a
very difficult issue for foreign companies to deal with while doing business in China.
Transfer pricing manipulation would be a good mechanism to tackle the strict control
on foreign exchange. By over-pricing imports and under -pricing exports, profits and
thus the foreign currencies will be shifted to their associa te companies located
overseas.

3.2.6

Repatriation of Profits, Royalties, Interest and Other Inter-company
Charges
To reduce capital outflow and to improve their balance of payments, many

developing countries have introduced measures to restrict MNCs in the repatriation
of profits, royalties and other inter-company charges, or have imposed high
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withholding taxes on these remittances.

China does not impose restrictions on

foreign investors repatriating their share of profits in foreign exchange, provided that
the FIEs have enough foreign exchange for such remittances and the remittances are
supported by a written resolution of the board of directors. Remittance of dividends
is subject to a withholding tax of 10 percent for equity joint ventures and 20 percent
for foreign enterprises. However, dividends paid by FIEs to their foreign investors
have been exempted from withholding tax since 1991.
Royalties paid to foreign companies for licensing of trademarks, copyrights,
know-how and other technical transfers are deductible for tax purposes provided that
the amounts are reasonable, and are subject to 20 percent withholding tax. However,
the royalties paid by a branch to its foreign head office are not deductible and there is
no issue of any withholding tax since both of them are treated as the same entity.
Interest paid on loans to overseas holding companies is deductible subject to thin
capitalization rules and an arm’s length rate test. Interest income is also subject to
the basic withholding tax of 20 percent. As in the treatment of royalties, interest paid
by a branch to its foreign head office is not tax deductible and there is no
withholding tax charged. The withholding tax rate for royalties and interest can be
reduced under a tax treaty. Under a tax treaty, the withholding rate is reduced to 10
percent or less in most cases. The withholding tax paid in China can be treated as tax
credits in foreign countries under tax treaties. Currently, China has signed tax
treaties with the US, Canada and most European and Asia Pacific countries including
UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. Therefore, the withholding tax payment
should not be an additional cost for the MNCs.

However, if the Chinese tax

authorities are of the opinion that the transfer prices for the royalties and interest
payments are not at arm’s length, they are empowered to adjust the prices
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accordingly. The withholding taxes already paid on the royalties and interest are not
refundable. Thus, these amounts would be double taxed in China.
For management services fees, general management fees allocated by
overseas associate companies are not deductible for tax purposes. However, genuine
charges paid to affiliates for provision of specific services relevant to production and
business operations such as marketing and advertising service fees are deductible.
No withholding tax is charged on the payment of such service fees.

3.2.7

Political and Social Pressures
Risk of expropriation and nationalization is a critical concern for foreign

investors. To reassure investors that China offers a safe and hospitable environment
for investment, China has enacted laws for joint ventures and for wholly foreignowned enterprises which state that China shall protect the lawful rights and interests
of foreign investors in China, including their rights to remit profits abroad (NPC
1979, 1986, 1988). The State has thereby promised not to nationalize or expropriate
FIEs except under special circumstances where such an action is in the national
interest. Commensurate compensation is assured under Chinese law in the event of
nationalization.
In relation to social pressure, labor unions are an important concern. FIEs’
employees have the right to establish grassroots labor unions if more than 25
employees are members of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. If there are
less than 25 labor union members, workers may select a representative on their own.
The Ministry of Labor has made rulings to strengthen the role of labor unions in
collective bargaining procedures. However, in practice, labor unions in China are
less confrontational and seldom represent employees’ interest. In most cases, they
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simply organize various social activities for employees. Therefore, FIEs need not to
be too concerned about the power of labor unions.

3.3

REGULATIONS FOR TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA

3.3.1

General Legal Environment in China
One of the risks for FIEs in China is the uncertain regulatory environment.

Regulatory consistency and certainty are crucial to long term investment pla ns and
operations by FIEs. It was reported that an uncertain regulatory environment in
China was a major difficulty confronting foreign investors (US-China Business
Council 1992).

Companies have cited the lack of transparency and clarity of

regulations, and the lack of uniformity and consistency in interpreting and
implementing regulations as obstacles for successful business operations in China.
However, improvements have been made over the years; for example, the Tax
Administration and Collection Law was issued in 2001 which clarifies the powers of
tax authorities and the rights of taxpayers.

3.3.2

Transfer Pricing Legislation in 1991
Transfer pricing provisions were first introduced in national legislation under

Article 13 of the Income Tax Law adopted in 1991 by the National People’s
Congress. The Income Tax Law stipulates that the payment or receipt of charges or
fees in business transactions between a FIE in China and its associated enterprises
shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of charges or fees in
business transactions between independent enterprises.

Where the payment or

receipt of charges or fees is not made in the same manner as in business transactions
between independent enterprises and results in a reduction of taxa ble income, the tax
authorities shall have the right to make reasonable adjustments.
48

According to the Income Tax Law, the China tax authorities are empowered
to make adjustments of transfer prices which are not in accordance with the arm’s
length principle. The operational rules and regulations of Article 13 of the Income
Tax Law are provided under Article 52-58 of the Detailed Rules and Regulations on
Implementation of Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and
Foreign Enterprises (Detaile d Rules). The Detailed Rules provide the definition of
associated enterprises, categories of related-party transactions and pricing methods,
etc.

However, the definitions and guidelines under the Detailed Rules are not

detailed enough. Thus, the SAT issued two other circulars as supplements in 1992.

3.3.3

Transfer Pricing Legislation in 1992
The Implementation Measures on Tax Administration of Business Dealings

between Associated Enterprises [i.e. Guoshuifa (1992) No. 237] was issued in 1992
for the implementation of the 1991 Income Tax Law and the Detailed Rules.
Circular No. 237 (1992) provides a more detailed definition of associated enterprises
as compared to the specifications in the Detailed Rules. It states that a foreign
enterprise and another company are associated in the following circumstances:
(i)

where an enterprise directly or indirectly owns 25 percent or more of another
enterprise;

(ii)

where two enterprises are directly or indirectly owned by a third enterprise
with 25 percent or more capital interest;

(iii)

where an enterprise borrows more than 50 percent of its loans from another
enterprise, or where an enterprise guarantees 10 percent or more of another
enterprise’s loan;
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(iv)

where one of the managing directors or half or more of the board of directors
or the executive managers of an enterprise is/ are appointed by another
enterprise;

(v)

where the raw materials and parts used by an enterprise for production are
supplied or controlled by another enterprise;

(vi)

where the sales of the commodities of an enterprise are controlled by another
enterprise; or

(vii)

where the production, trading activities and profits of an enterprise are
effectively controlled by another enterprise which has a mutual interest, such
as the existence of family relationship.

Circular No. 237 (1992) also imposes information-reporting requirements on
every FIE taxpayer. FIEs are required to disclose their related-party transactions in a
form called the Declaration Form for Transactions Between Related Parties
(“Declaration Form”). This form is an integral part of the Annual Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Return. Without this form, the tax authorities will consider the annual
tax filing incomplete and thus reject the tax return submitted.
Apart from Circular No. 237 (1992), the Implementation Rules and
Procedures on Tax Administration of Transfer Pricing among Associated Enterprises
[i.e. Guoshuifa (1992) No. 242] was issued in 1992. This publication provides a
detailed set of implementation rules and procedures which serves as an internal
operational manual for tax authorities.

Circular No. 242 (1992) sets out the

procedural aspects in dealing with transfer pricing, including selection of enterprises
for investigation, scope of investigation, audit techniques and procedures, scope of
adjustments and selection of adjustment methods, collection and inquiry of price
information, procedures and authority for approving adjustments, appeals,
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compilation and report of audit cases, and audit documentation and administration.
However, in practice, local tax authorities did not place much emphasis on enforcing
these transfer pricing rules. In 1998, a more detailed implementation rule was issued
for guiding the audits for related-party transactions and for stressing the importance
of transfer pricing compliance.

3.3.4

Transfer pricing legislation in 1998
Circular No. 59 (1998) [i.e. Guoshuifa (1998) No. 59] contains 52 articles

aimed at setting the criteria for selecting target FIEs for tax audits, standardizing
transfer pricing examination procedures and strengthening internal coordination
between the local tax authorities and the State Administration of Taxation. Thus,
Circular No. 59 (1998) provides detailed methodologies and procedures for tax
authorities to follow when carrying out a transfer pricing audit.

3.3.4.1 Filing requirement
Circular No.59 (1998) specified two types of declaration form to be used in
declaring related-party transactions. A separate form needs to be filed for each
affiliated enterprise. An “A” type form is used by enterprises with a single category
of transactions with an affiliated company, and a “B” type form is used by
enterprises with multiple categories of transactions with an affiliated company.
Enterprises failing to file the required forms are subject to penalties of up to RMB
10,000.
Four types of related-party transactions are identified by Circular No. 59
(1998), including (i) purchases, sales, transfers and use of tangible assets like
buildings, transportation vehicles, machinery and equipment, tools, and merchandise;
(ii) transfers and use of intangible assets like land use rights, copyrights, trademarks,
51

brands, patents, proprietary technologies, industrial property rights and the provision
of services relating to such transfer or right to use; (iii) financing of short-term and
long-term loans and guarantees, sales of securities, and all kinds of interest bearing
prepayments and deferred payments; and (iv) provision of services such as provision
of market research, marketing, management, administration, technic al services,
repairs, design, consulting, agency, research and development, and legal and
accounting services.

3.3.4.2 Selection of FIEs for tax audit
The Forms A and B together with the financial reports of the companies will
serve as the initial documentation that the tax authorities use to identify transfer
pricing audit targets. Circular No. 59 (1998) extends Circular No. 242 (1992) to
include ten types of potential audit targets. They include:
(i)

enterprises that are controlled by related parties in respect of management and
business operations;

(ii)

enterprises that have significant amounts of transactions with related parties;

(iii)

enterprises with continuing losses (i.e. reporting losses for more than two
consecutive years);

(iv)

enterprises that increase the ir scale of operations continuously while
consistently reporting losses or small profits;

(v)

enterprises with a fluctuating pattern of profits and losses (e.g. enterprises
making profit every other year or in an irregular pattern);

(vi)

enterprises that have business dealings with related parties established in tax
havens;
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(vii)

enterprises whose profit levels are lower than those of other enterprises in the
same industry based on a comparison with the regular profit level obtained by
similar enterprises in the same re gion;

(viii)

enterprises whose profit margin is lower than that of other enterprises within
the same group of enterprises based on a comparison with related parties
within the group;

(ix)

enterprises that pay unreasonable expenses to related parties using various
schemes; and

(x)

enterprises that report a sharp decrease in profits after the expiration of their
tax holidays, and other enterprises that are suspected of tax avoidance.

In practice, enterprises with continuing losses and enterprises that have low
profits compared to their scale of operation or industry average are the more
important selection criteria for transfer pricing audit. Circular No. 59 (1998) requires
an audit coverage of at least 30 percent of the identified audit targets for each year.
However, due to a shortage of manpower, it might be difficult for the tax authorities
to achieve this coverage. Nevertheless, the statistics show that the number of actual
transfer pricing audit cases is increasing (Nelson et al. 2003). There were 1,230
transfer pricing audits conducted in 2001, which represented a 11.6 percent increase
from year 2000, and the tax authorities recovered US$40 million from these transfer
pricing adjustments (Chinese Tax News 2002).

3.3.4.3 Audit procedures
Transfer pricing tax audits are generally conducted within three years
commencing in the year following the relevant tax year and adjustments may be
made retrospectively for a period up to ten years. Transfer pricing audits are
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generally divided into desk audits and field audits. The tax authorities conduct desk
audits at their office first. They issue a notice to the target companies and request
them to provide relevant documents and transfer pricing information within 60 days.
The information requested includes business and tax certificates, investment and
operation contracts, articles of association, feasibility studies, annual financial
statements, audit reports, account books and vouchers, commercial contracts, and
other relevant documents.

Based on the information provided by the target

companies, tax authorities conduct a systematic analysis to evaluates the profit or
loss on sales, rates of return on investments, and the reasonableness of costs,
expenses and prices.

Subsequently, the tax authorities conduct a field audit to

resolve any issues arising from the desk audit. They issue notices to the target
companies three to seven days before the field audits, and at least two auditors will
be on site to conduct the field audit. During the visit to the enterprise, the auditors
will obtain further evidence of transfer pricing manipulation and the taxpayer's
explanations of these. The burden of proof that the transfer prices are at arm’s length
prices is on the taxpayers being investigated.

3.3.4.4 Transfer pricing adjustments
If the tax authorities are of the opinion that the related-party transactions are
not conducted in an arm's length manner, an adjustment to taxable income will be
proposed. The transfer pricing adjustments for tangible goods are based on the
comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale -minus method, or the cost -plus
method.
Under the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUPM), the arm’s length
price should be the price charged in comparable sales to unrelated third parties.
When using the CUPM, the tax authorities consider the comparability of purchase
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and sales procedures, comparability of logistics arrangements at each of the purchase
and sales links, comparability of products transferred, and comparability of
environment.
Under the resale price method (RPM), transfer prices are determined by
reference to the profit margin realized in transactions between two unrelated
enterprises. This method is only used in the situation where the reseller performs
simple processing work or pure buy-and-sell trading activities. This method is not
appropriate if the reseller adds substantial value to the tangible goods by materially
altering or processing the products such as changing the appearance, function,
structure or trademark of the product.
Under the cost plus method (CPM), transfer prices are determined by
reference to the profit mark-up realized in a transaction between two unrelated
enterprises. The tax authorities would first consider whether the cost and expenses
are calculated in accordance with the China tax law. Then, they would apply a
reasonable deemed profit margin, with reference to similar business in China, to
arrive at an arm's-length price.
Under Circular No. 59 (1998), the comparable profit method, profit split
method, net profit method, and deemed profit margin method are allowed as other
reasonable methods for adjusting transfer prices in case if the CUPM, RPM and
CPM are not applicable. However, Circular No. 59 (1998) does not provide any
definitions of these other methods.
For financing related-party transactions, adjustments to interest charges
between associated enterprises is made based on prevailing interest rates with
reference to the comparability of the financing transactions between the associated
enterprise transactions and non-associated enterprise transactions (i.e. factors such as
the loan amount, type of currency, loan terms, term of guarantee, borrower's credit,
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repayment terms, interest calculation method, etc, would be taken into account). If
the funds of lender are borrowed from other parties, the prevailing interest is the
actual interest payment made by the lender plus costs, expenses and a reasonable
profit margin.
For adjusting service fees or rentals, the tax authorities refer to the normal
service fee or rental charges between unrelated parties under the same or similar
circumstances. They take into account the type of services provided, nature of the
business, technology requirements, professional standards, responsibility assumed,
payment terms and conditions, and direct and indirect expenses for determining
arm’s length services fees. They would take into account the function, specifications,
structure, type, depreciation methods of the rental property, the time and place of the
usage of the property, capital investment, and maintenance expenses that the property
owner has spent on the property for determining arm’s length rental charges.
For adjusting prices of intangible property, tax authorities refer to the price
that would normally be agreeable to an unrelated party, taking into consideration the
development and investment, conditions of transfer, level of exclusivity, extent and
duration of legal protection, expected benefit to the transferee, investment and cost of
the transferee, and substituta bility.
The tax authorities present their audit findings and discuss the proposed
adjustments with the enterprise being audited. If there is any disagreement, the
enterprise must provide further information within the time frame given by the tax
authorit ies for their consideration. Upon receiving the additional information, the tax
authorities will rule within 30 days and issue a “Notice of Adjustment of Transfer
Pricing, Taxable Income and Tax Payable” to the enterprise. Taxpayers must settle
the additional tax within the time frame given by the tax authorities. An extension of
not more than three months may be obtained in case of special circumstances or
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financial hardship. In addition, the Tax Collection Law (2001) empowers the tax
authorities to impose a penalty up to five times the tax underpaid due to transfer
pricing manipulation. In serious cases, criminal liability may also be pursued.
Taxpayers need to adjust their accounting books to reflect the full amount of
taxable income being adjusted by the tax authorities. If they fail to adjust their books,
the excessive amount received by the associate companies will be treated as a
deemed dividend received. This deemed dividend will be subject to a withholding
tax of 20 percent, and no exemption of withholding tax for foreign investors will be
available in this case. If the excess income received by the foreign party is interest,
royalty or other income which has already been subject to withholding tax, there will
also be no recovery of such withholding tax paid.

3.3.4.5 Appeal system
Taxpayers must pay the tax according to the “Notice of Adjustment of
Transfer Pricing, Taxable Income and Tax Payable” issued by tax authorities before
they can appeal against the assessment.

They must file an appeal with the tax

authorities at the next higher level within 60 days. Upon receipt of the appeal, the
next higher tax authorities make a decision within 60 days. However, in practice,
since tax authorities frequently check with the next higher level tax authorities before
making an additional tax assessment, there is no effective appeal of an assessment
except to the People's Court (Wong and Chong 1999). Taxpayers need to initiate
proceedings before the People’s Court within 15 days if they are not satis fied with
the decisions from the higher level tax authorities. However, as keeping a good
relationship with local authorities is crucial for operating in China, it would be
unwise for FIEs to sue the local tax authorities in court (CCH 2003).
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3.3.4.6 Ad vance pricing agreements
The most important provision in Circular No. 59 (1998) is the introduction
for the first time of advance pricing agreement (APA), an agreement between a
taxpayer and tax authority on how a proposed transaction will be treated for tax
purposes. According to the Circular, a company can submit an application for an
APA by providing an application form together with relevant information. After
review of the information and documents, the tax authorities may sign an APA with
the enterprise and supervise its implementation. Theoretically, if the related-party
transactions follow the APA, no transfer pricing adjustments would be made.
However, the reference to APAs in Circular No. 59 (1998) is extremely brief. It does
not include the application form nor set out the details of the application procedures
and information required for the APA application.

3.3.5

Tax Dispute Resolution Methods
In China, tax disputes can be resolved by an institutionalized or a non-

institutionalized method (Chan and Jiang 2002). An institutionalized method refers
to a mechanism or procedure that has been expressly recognized and authorized by
national legislation to handle disputes between taxpayers and tax officials.

An

administrative hearing, administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation
are all institutionalized methods for handling tax disputes.

If taxpayers have

objections on decisions of Chinese tax authorities, they can apply for administrative
hearings in writing within three days of the notification of the decisions.
Administrative reconsideration enables taxpayers to appeal to a superior tax body
against a decision made by lower level officials. Administrative reconsideration
must be filed within 60 days of receiving the decision in question. Taxpayers can
also bring court lawsuits against tax authorities by the administrative litigation within
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15 days of receiving the administrative reconsideration decision. Taxpayers must
file an administrative reconsideration before institutin g an administrative litigation
proceeding for cases involving a tax collection decision, decision of assessing tax
liability or imposing interest on late payment. Non-institutionalized methods include
negotiation with the tax authorities, an appeal to the tax official’s superior, and
exposure or complaints through the mass media.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TAXPAYERS

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This Chapter empirically examines the direct association between management’s
perception of the importance of environmental variables and management’s choice of
international transfer pricing methods. I collected the data from field interviews with
the management of large foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China. These FIEs
include mainly investors from the US, Japan and Europe. The empirical evidence
indicate s that the more important the management perceives the interest of local
partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host government, the
more likely that the FIE will use a market-based transfer pricing method. On the
other hand, the more important the management perceives foreign exchange controls
in transfer pricing decisions, the more likely the FIE will choose a cost-based
method.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TAXPAYERS 1

4.1

INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the business environment in China provides

mixed inducements for MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions. Strategically selected
transfer prices can maximize global tax savings, minimize operating risks and
circumvent restrictions imposed by host governments. Management needs to tradeoff among this set of contradicting objectives through their choice of transfer pricing
methods. While it is difficult to examine managers’ decisions of these trade -offs
directly, the trade -offs are reflected in perceptions of the relative importance of
environmental variables in managers’ choice of transfer pricing methods.

This

chapter empirically investigates how managers’ perceptions of environmental
variables influence their choice of international transfer pricing methods.
Seven environmental variables important to operating businesses in
developing countries are examined in the context of the business environment in
China. These variables are: (1) differences in income tax rates, (2) minimization of
custom duties, (3) interests of local partners, (4) foreign exchange control and risks,
(5) restrictions on profit repatriation, (6) risks of expropriation and nationalization,
and (7) relationships with the host government. While the first two variables are
generally relevant to all countries, the other five variables are of special relevance to
developing countries.
________________________
1

Part of the materials of this chapter will be published in a forthcoming issue of The International

Journal of Accounting.
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Empirical studies reveal that MNCs rarely adopt transfer pricing methods
Based on economic models such as marginal cost and opportunity cost methods,
because these models are not comprehensive enough to model the global
environment of MNCs (Wu and Sharp 1979; Yunker 1983; Tang 1979, 1981, 1993).
In practice, market-based methods and methods based on accounting costs are most
commonly used.

Mar ket-based methods use comparable market prices or adjusted

market prices which reflect the economy of internal transfers. Advocates of these
methods argue that market prices are less manipulative, and disputes between
managers of affiliates can be minimiz ed (Granick 1975; Anthony and Dearden 1980;
Cook 1995). They are also perceived to be relatively objective and fair, and are less
likely to be challenged by tax authorities (Al-Eryani 1987). Cost-based methods
include actual full cost, standard full cost, actual variable cost and standard variable
cost. Mark-up may or may not be added to costs. If the company’s policy is to tie
the mark-up to prevailing market prices, the transfer pricing method will be
classified as a market-based method. If the policy is to determine mark-up based on
a desired rate of return on investment or capital, the transfer pricing method will be
classified as a cost-based method.

Cost-based methods are basically internally

determined using available cost data. It is conceded in the literature that these
methods are subject to inherent arbitrariness in cost allocation and difficulties in
determining a fair profit to add to cost (Thomas 1971; Merville and Petty 1978;
MaAulay and Tomkins 1992). Because of this arbitrariness, the se methods provide
more room for MNCs to pursue their corporate objectives in maximizing after-tax
profits and minimizing operational risks.

I will evaluate how management

perceptions of the seven environmental variables affect their choice between the tw o
transfer pricing methods in the following sections.
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4.2

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

4.2.1 Difference in Corporate Income Tax Rates
It is commonly recognized that differences in income tax rates among
jurisdictions provides MNCs with incentives to use transfer pricing strategy to
minimize global tax payments (Chan and Chow 1997b). The greater the difference
in income tax rates between two countries, the greater is the incentive for MNCs to
use transfer pricing to shift income.
As elaborated in Chapter 3, the income tax rate applicable to FIEs operating
in China is 30 percent.
foreign investors.

The government offers certain tax incentives for qualified

A preferential income tax rate of 15 percent is granted to FIEs

located in special economic zones and in economic and technological development
zones. A preferential rate of 24 percent is offered to industrial FIEs located in open
economic zones and cities. For FIEs of a production nature scheduled to operate for
a period not less than ten years, an exemption from taxation for the first two profitmaking years and a 50 percent tax reduction for the following three years are
granted. However, currently, many FIEs are either beyond their tax holiday period
or do not qualify for such holidays.
Although minimization of taxes is often cited as a transfer pricing objective,
some argue that the significance of tax considerations should not be over-rated in
developing countries because of the existence of nontax influences in these countries
(Kim and Miller 1979; Plasschaert 1985). However, in general, tax minimization
remains an important issue in transfer pricing decisions. The more important tax
minimization is perceived to be, the greater the motivation for management to use
transfer pricing strategy to reduce global tax payments, and the more likely
management will adopt cost-based transfer pricing methods which facilitate the
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pursuit of this corporate objective.

The reasoning is reflected in the following

hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The more important the difference in corporate income tax
rates is perceived by management of FIEs, the more likely that a cost-based transfer
pricing method will be adopted.

4.2.2 Minimization of Custom Duties
Minimization of import duties provides an incentive for MNCs to underprice goods transferred into a country.

Under-pricing of imports can also

circumvent restrictions such as a value quota on imports imposed by a host
government. The Chinese government adopts a tariff escalation policy whereby
nominal tariffs vary with the degree of domestic processing. Tariffs are lower for
raw materials and semi-processed materials than for final goods.

Like other

developing countries, import duties in China are in general substantially higher than
those in developed countries, although there is a downward trend since China has
entered the World Trade Organization. There is a prima facie inference that the
relatively high ad valorem tariffs in most developing countries are likely to tempt
MNCs to use transfer pricing to minimize tariff payments (Plasschaert 1985).
However, under-pricing of imports from related companies to minimize tariff
payments will result in higher reported profits by FIEs, and this is not compatible
with the considerations of restrictions on profit repatriation and foreign exchange
control as discussed later. The impact of custom duties on FIEs’ transfer pricing
decisions thus depends on the relative importance of this variable as perceived by
management. The more important the tariffs are perceived by management, the
more likely that the management will adopt cost-based transfer pricing methods to
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facilitate the minimization of tariff payments. This argument provides the basis for
the second research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The more important minimization of custom duties is
perceived by FIEs’ management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing
method will be used.

4.2.3 The Interest of Local Partners
Like many developing countries, the Chinese government prefers foreign
investors to operate in China in the form of a joint venture with a local partner. The
existence of a local partner in a joint venture reduces the share of reported profits
attributable to foreign investors, and hence provides an inducement for the foreign
investors to use transfer pricing to shift profits outwards (Emmanuel and Mehafdi
1994). As more profits are shifted away from China, the local partner’s share of
profit will be reduced. To safeguard their legitimate interest, the local partners may
actively get involved in transfer pricing decisions. Thus, a local partner may play a
monitoring role which restricts the latitude of transfer pricing strategies practiced by
foreign investors (Lall 1973; Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994).
In some joint ventures in China , the parties may enter into a management
contract, whereby full management responsibility is delegated to the foreign partners
who control the production and financial functions of business operations. In other
cases, local partners participate actively in the business decisions. It is hypothesized
that the impact of local partners on transfer pricing decisions depends on the
management role of local partners and the importance of the interest of local
partners as perceived by corporate management. The greater the importance of the
interest of a local partner is perceived by corporate management, the more likely that
management will attempt to minimize conflicts between partners over transfer
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pricing by adopting a method that is relatively objective and fair to both parties and
with less room for manipulation. This leads to a greater likelihood of adopting a
market-based transfer pricing method, as stated below.
Hypothesis 3: The more important the interest of local partners is perceived
by corporate management, the more likely that a market-based transfer pricing
method will be adopted.

4.2.4 Foreign Exchange Control and Risks
Foreign exchange control imposed by developing countries is regarded as a
strong inducement for MNCs to shift profits out of these countries. Fewer facilities
are available in these countries to hedge against exchange losses. Transfer pricing
can assist in managing foreign exchange risks by reducing liquid assets of
subsidiaries in countries where foreign exchange control is imposed.
As elaborated in Chapter 3, until the early 1990s China adopted a centrally
managed foreign exchange control system which provided limited access to foreign
exchange. Foreign investment enterprises were allowed to retain foreign exchange
earnings and made payments of foreign exchange therefrom.

These enterprises

were required to balance their foreign exchange revenues and expenditures, and
were required to file with the government their annual budget of foreign exchange
expenditures.

Since 1994, the government has gradually relaxed its foreign

exchange control policy. A system of limited convertibility of the local currency,
the Renminbi, was introduced. In 1996, the Renminbi became freely convertible for
current account items including payments for trading, transportation and tourism
activities. However, capital account transactions including capital investment are
still subject to foreign exchange control.
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The limited-convertibility of the Renminbi and the restrictions on access to
foreign exchange increase the financial risks for business operations in China.
Shortage of foreign exchange has been cited as one of the most serious problems
facing FIEs, especially those aiming at the domestic market or those relying heavily
on imports of raw materials and machinery (Frisbie 1988; Davis and Yi 1992). The
significance of the impact of foreign exchange control on an FIE depends on the
nature of its business operations. It is hypothesized that the more important foreign
exchange control is perceived by management, the greater the inducement for
management to use transfer pricing to circumvent such a control and to reduce
associated risks. This leads to the greater likelihood that management will adopt a
cost-based transfer pricing method which pr ovides management more flexibility in
pursuing this objective.
Hypothesis 4: The more important foreign exchange control and risks is
perceived by management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing method
will be adopted.

4.2.5 Restrictio ns on Profit Repatriation
Restrictions on profit remittances including dividends, royalties and
management fees, or high withholding tax on such remittances imposed by host
countries provide an inducement for MNCs to shift funds through transfer pricing.
As these restrictions are more likely to be imposed by governments in developing
countries relative to developed countries, this variable is considered important to
transfer pricing decisions in developing countries (Kim and Miller 1979; Plasschaert
1985).
While the Chinese government does not ban foreign investors from
repatriating their legitimate share of profits or royalties, these remittances are subject
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to the availability of sufficient foreign exchange that an FIE has for this purpose.
Withholding taxes on payments of interest, rental charges and royalties to affiliated
companies are levied at a general rate of 20 percent, or at a preferential rate as
specified in tax treaties. According to tax treaties entered into by the Chinese
government with other countries, these taxes are allowed as credits against home
countries’ corporate income tax. However, Chinese tax law disallows the
repatriation of management fees to parent companie s, except for those incurred for
specific and direct services provided by the parent companies such as training the
local employees of the FIEs. The impact of these regulations on transfer pricing
decisions depends upon managers’ perception of their importance.

The more

important the restrictions on profit remittances are perceived by management, the
greater the motivation to circumvent these restrictions, and the more likely that costbased transfer pricing methods will be used as a mechanism to pursue this objective.
Hypothesis 5: The more important the management perceives the
restrictions on profit repatriation, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing
method will be used.

4.2.6 Risks of Expropriation and Nationalization
The perceived political risks relating to foreign operations including
expropriation and nationalization has been a concern for MNCs operating in
developing countries. A high perceived risk may motivate MNCs to seek an early
return on investment through the transfer pricing mechanism. Political risk has been
a major concern to foreign investors in socialist countries. To alleviate foreign
investors’ concerns, the Chinese government has enacted laws to protect their legal
rights and interests. The government also signed bilateral investment treaties with
more than forty countries, including the UK, Japan, Australia, Germany and France.
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These guarantee either no expropriation or compensation in the event of
expropriation. However, China has not been able to conclude an investment treaty
with the US While the possibility of expropriation of foreign-invested enterprises is
small, the risk cannot be rule d out. For example, in order to construct the famous
Oriental Plaza in Beijing, McDonald’s was pushed off the site, although it had a 20year lease there. The government retains the right to nationalize or expropriate
enterprises under special circumstances. The more important management perceives
this risk, the greater disposition management will have to use transfer pricing to
minimize it by diverting liquid funds outwards, and the more likely that cost-based
transfer pricing methods will be used.
Hypothesis 6: The more important the management perceives the risks of
expropriation and nationalization, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing
method will be used.

4.2.7 Good Relationship with the Host Government
Empirical studies reveal that MNCs give consideration to maintaining good
relations with host governments when formulating their transfer pricing policies
(Tang 1979, 1981; Yunker 1983). Al-Eryani (1987) find that this variable is more
important for MNCs operating in developing countries than for their counterparts
operating in developed countries. In China, a good relationship with government
authorities is helpful in smoothing business operations and in negotiating
bureaucratic hurdles. This is in part cultural and in part because the legal system in
China is not as transparent as that in most developed countries (Chan and Jiang
2002). To maintain a good relationship with the government, FIEs try to avoid any
disputes or conflicts with the tax authorities and the government departments. Thus,
it is hypothesized that FIEs will more likely use market-based methods that are
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perceived to be more objective than cost-based methods in formulating their transfer
pricing policies to avoid such disputes and conflicts.
Hypothesis 7: The more important management perceives maintenance of a
good relationship with the Chinese government, the more likely that an FIE will use
market-based transfer pricing methods.

A summary of these hypotheses is shown in Table 4.1.
[Insert Table 4.1 here]

4.3

DATA COLLECTION
I conducted a series of interviews with management of sample FIEs to

collect the data for this study. The interview questionnaire consists of three sections.
Section 1 is related to the transfer pricing policies adopted by the sample firms
(FIEs). Interviewees were asked to elaborate on their dominant transfer pricing
method (in terms of dollar value transferred) for trading with their overseas affiliates,
and on the transfer pricing decision-making process.

Section 2 contains

demographic information about the FIEs, including source and percentage of foreign
investment, size of the firm, volume of trade with overseas affiliated companies, and
income tax rates applicable to the company. Section 3 consists of questions on the
perceptions of management regarding the importance of the seven environmental
variables when formulating transfer pricing policies. Interviewees were asked to
assess the importance of these variables when formulating their transfer pricing
policies. The importance of each variable was measured by using a five -point scale
(1-Extremely important, 2-Very important, 3-Moderately important, 4-Not too
important, and 5-Not important at all).
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The intervie ws were conducted in the major cities of China, including
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shenzhen and the open cities of Pearl River
Delta. The sample FIEs for the interviews were selected from a directory of the top
(largest 500) industrial FIEs in China as designated by the Chinese government in
terms of annual sales. FIEs located in these cities and having trade of goods or
materials with their overseas affiliated companies were contacted for interview. A
total sample of sixty-four FIEs provide s information for this study.
Interview is considered an appropriate methodology for a study of this nature
which examines a sensitive and complex issue.

Faculty members of local

universities and partners of local CPA firms utilized their contacts in China to assist
in arranging these interviews. They also attended the interviews. Because the
interviewees know the local contacts, they have more confidence on the proper use
of information.

I assured the interviewees that the information will be kept

confidential and used for academic research purposes only. Behavioral research
confirms that an on-going personal relationship with the interviewees promotes
truthful responses (Bazerman et al. 2002). When arranging the interviews, the local
contacts informed the interviewees about the nature of the interviews and were
assured of the interviewees’ familiarity with the transfer pricing setting process in
their firm before arranging the interviews.

I chose to interview the financial

controllers of these FIEs who actively participate in the transfer pricing decisions
because of their expertise. With their first -hand knowledge of and experience in
operating environments in China, they were particularly able to articulate the
importance of the hypothesized environmental variables and their tradeoffs in
achieving the transfer pricing objectives. In some cases, interviewees brought along
their assistants to the interview to make sure that they could answer my questions
comprehensively. All the interviewees were either expatriates sent from overseas
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head offices who had extensive experience in China or local persons who received
training from the head office. They were clearly familiar with the transfer pricing
processes in their enterprises. At the beginning of the interviews, I explained the
objective of the study and assured the confidentiality of the data they provided. I
also explained the various transfer pricing methods in order to assure common
understanding of the terms and proper codification of the methods adopted by these
FIEs. When explaining the terms and asking the questions, I was careful not to give
my own opinion which may influence the interviewees’ responses.

I also paid

attention to the interviewees’ response to see whether there were any inconsistent
answers during the interview.

After the interview, I searched the business

directories to verify the demographic information provided by the interviewees. I
also conducted interviews with four partners in two large CPA firms in Hong Kong
and talked to several CPA firm partners in China to confirm the reasonableness and
logic of the data collected. As the local contacts knew the interviewees, I was able
to contact the interviewees after the interview when necessary for any follow -up
clarifica tion of my interview notes. These control measures taken together provide
reasonable assurance that the data collected are valid and reliable.

4.4

ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.4.1 Profile of the Sample Firms
The 64 sample firms are engaged in the business of manufacturing different
products, including chemicals, electronics, electrical appliances, pharmaceutical and
medical equipment. The foreign investment of these FIEs are mainly sourced from
the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and European counties, including the
UK, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and France. About 30
percent of the sample firms are from the upper tier of the top 500 companies in terms
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of sales. The annual sales range from US$60 million to more than US$3,000 million.
Foreign investors in all sample firms hold at least 25 percent of equity shares,
including eleven wholly foreign-owned enterprises. On average, foreign investors
hold 63 percent of the equity shares of the FIE. Most of these FIEs have a great
volume of transactions with their overseas affiliated companies. In 51 FIEs (80
percent of the sample firms), inter-affiliate trade accounts for more than 75 percent
of their total trade.

4.4.2 Transfer Pricing Policies
Thirty-eight FIEs (59 percent of the sample) adopted market-based transfer
pricing methods, and most of them used adjusted market prices. Adjusted market
prices are the comparable market prices adjusted by an amount reflecting the
economic difference between open market sales and internal transfers, for example,
the marketing costs saved. Usually, the adjustment can be easily determined and
documented. Of the 26 FIEs (41 percent of the sample) which adopted cost-based
methods, more than half of them used standard full cost plus markups (Table 4.2A).
Marginal cost, opportunity cost, mathematical programming, and profit-split methods
were not used. A great majority of the sample firms (75 percent) have the autonomy
to purchase raw materials and components from unrelated companies (Table 4.2B).
FIEs with more autonomy will have greater power when setting transfer prices with
their affiliates. In 41 FIEs (64 percent of the sample), parent companies of foreign
partners were consulted in determining transfer pricing policies, and more than half
of these were FIEs with the majority shareholdings by foreign investors (Table
4.2C). Fourteen FIEs (22 percent of the sample) determined their transfer pricing
policies without direct influence from parent companies. Nine FIEs (14 percent of
the sample), all being US MNCs, adopted their parent company’s worldwide transfer
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pricing policies.

Only 16 percent of the sample firms have had disputes with

affiliates over transfer prices during the past two years (Table 4.2D).

Several

approaches were adopted to resolve these disputes, including negotiation between
FIEs and related companies, negotiation with interference from the parent
companies, or negotiation with interference from the tax authorities.
[Insert Table 4.2 here]

4.4.3 Importance of Environmental Variables as Perceived by Management
Table 4.3 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven
hypothesized environmental variables as perceived by the management of the
sample firms (range is from 1 to 5 with 1 being most important). For the overall
sample, maintaining a good relationship with the Chinese government and
differences in income tax rates are perceived as the two most important variables.
Risk of expropriation and nationalization by host countries is perceived as least
influential in the choice of transfer pricing methods. A comparison is made between
US FIEs and non-US FIEs in my sample to see whether these firms take the same
environmental factors into account when choosing their transfer pricing methods, as
revealed by Arpan (1972).

The Mann-Whitney tests do not reveal significant

differences in the importance of these variables as perceived by US and by non-US
FIEs. The Kendall-tau test of the rank-order of the importance of these variables
(correlation coefficient = 0.586; p=0.068) shows that there is moderate agreement
between these two groups on the relative importance of the variables.
[Insert Table 4.3 here]
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Finally, a check of the correlations among the environmental variables shows
that only differences in income tax rates (Variable 1) and minimization of custom
duties (Variable 2) have a moderate correlation of slightly larger than 0.50. As will
be explained later, multi-collinearity and sensitivity tests show that this correlation
has no impact on the analysis.

4.4.4 Statistical Testing of Research Hypotheses
Table 4.4 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven
hypothesized environmental variables as perceived by FIEs using market-based
transfer pricing methods and those using cost-based transfer pricing methods. The
statistical tests of these mean scores reveal significant differences in the perceived
importance of three variables between FIEs using different transfer pricing methods.
These three variables are the interest of local pa rtners, foreign exchange control and
risks (both significant at the 5 percent level), and good relationship with the Chinese
government (significant at 10 percent level).

FIEs using market- based transfer

pricing methods perceived the interest of local partners and a good relationship with
the Chinese government as more important, while FIEs using cost-based transfer
pricing methods perceived the foreign exchange control as more important. Risk of
expropriation and nationalization, which has been regarded in prior studies as
important for business operations in developing socialist countries, is not perceived
as important for FIEs using either the cost-based or market-based transfer pricing
method. This suggests that with the endeavors to open up the economy and to
attract foreign investment, the Chinese government has successfully eased foreign
investors’ concern of political risks associated with their business operations.
[Insert Table 4.4 here]
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To further investigate the significance of management pe rceptions of the
importance of these variables to the choice of transfer pricing method in a
multivariate setting, a logistic regression analysis is performed (Simons 1987;
Menon and Williams 1991; Norusis 1999; Balakrishnan and Soderstrom 2000). The
logistic regression function is as follows:

TP = α 0 + ∑ α i Vari ,

(1)

i

where:
TP = binary variable assuming the value of 0 if cost-based methods are used, and 1
if market-based methods are used;
Vari = the importance of variable i, where i = 1,2,… .,7, measured by a five-point
scale with 1 being extremely important and 5 being not important at all.
These variables are:
Var1: Difference in income tax rates
Var2: Minimization of custom duties
Var3: Interest of local partners
Var4: Foreign exchange control and risks
Var5: Restrictions on profit repatriation
Var6: Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Var7: Good relationship with the Chinese government
α i values are the regression coefficients.

As the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression analysis is
appropriate to examine the significance of the hypothesized environmental variables
in discriminating between FIE’s choice of transfer pricing methods , i.e. marketbased or cost-based methods (Norusis 1999). The analysis predicts the probability
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that a particular transfer pricing method will be used when the importance of the
environmental variables changes. The results show how the trade-off among the
environmental variables affects the choice of transfer pricing methods. The results of
the regression analysis are shown in Table 4.5. Variance inflation factors are all less
than 2, indicating that multi-collinearity is unlikely to affect the inferences. White’s
heteroskedasticity test suggests that the homogeneous variance assumption was not
rejected at the 0.05 level.
The analysis confirmed that Var 3 and Var 4, i.e. the interest of local partners
and foreign exchange control and risks , are significant at 1 percent level and that
Var 7, i.e. good relationship with the Chinese government, is significant at 5 percent
level in discriminating FIEs’ choice of transfer pricing methods.

The model is

significant at the 1 percent level. Indicating a good fit of the model, 87 percent of
FIEs using market-based methods and 65 percent of FIEs using cost-based methods
are correctly classified. The signs of the coefficients for these three variables are
consistent with the hypotheses. FIEs which regard the interest of local partners and
a good relationship with the Chinese government as being important are more likely
to use market-based methods, and FIEs which perceive the foreign exchange control
and risks as being important are more likely to use cost-based methods.
results are consistent with my univariate analysis.

These

I do not find significant

discriminating power in Var 1, Var 2, Var 5 and Var 6, i.e. difference in income tax
rates, minimization of custom duties, restrictions on profit repatriation, and risks of
expropriation and nationalization. In other words, FIEs using cost-based methods
and FIEs using market-based methods perceive a similar degree of importance for
each of these variables. The increasingly effective tax audits in China may reduce
FIEs’ incentive to use cost-based methods to manipulate these variables. However,
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foreign exchange control remains the most important variable for FIEs using costbased methods (Table 4.5).
[Insert Table 4.5 here]

4.4.5 Sensitivity Tests
I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results.
First, I included a dummy variable signifying a majority and a minority foreign
investor in my regression model. As shown in Table 4.6, the coefficient of this new
variable is not significant at 0.05 level and the results of the original and the new
model are basically the same.
[Insert Table 4.6 here]

Second, I tried two other logit models by adding a “percentage of foreign
ownership” variable and a “consultation” variable (i.e. a variable signifying whether
the FIEs set their transfer pricing policies with consultation of parent companies or
not). The results are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Both the percentage of foreign
ownership variable and the consultation variable are not significant at 0.05 level.
However, Variable 3 (Interest of local partners) becomes insignificant when
percentage of foreign ownership variable is added.

This is due to the strong

correlation between percentage of foreign ownership and Variable 3 (r = 0.719,
significant at 0.01 level). As the percentage of foreign ownership increases, the
interest of local partners becomes less important. As the main objective of my paper
is to analyze the influence of management perceptions of environmental variables on
the choice of transfer pricing methods, I chose to include the management
perception variable (i.e. the perceived importance of the interest of local partners)
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rather than the corporate attribute variable (i.e. percentage of foreign ownership) in
my regression.
[Insert Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 here]

Third, I performed a sensitivity test by simultaneous ly adding the above two
variables (percentage of foreign ownership and consultation) to the original
regression model. The results are basically the same as above.
Fourth, I excluded the nine companies which adopted their parent’s
worldwide transfer pricing policies from my regression model. Var 3, Var 4 and
Var 7 remain significant and all other variables remain insignificant. Therefore, the
nine cases which adopted worldwide policies do not affect the significance of my
results.
Fifth, I included a dummy variable representing US versus non-US foreign
investors. Sixth, I included interaction terms of (i) US with income tax variable
(Variable 1), (ii) US with foreign exchange control (Variable 4), and (iii) US with
risks of expropriation (Variable 6) respectively.

Seventh, I included a dummy

variable representing Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced versus other sourced FIEs.
Eighth, I included the size of the FIE (in terms of the logarithm of sales) in the
model. Ninth, I added a variable representing the FIE’s export as a percentage of
total sales.

Tenth, I included the FIE’s proportion of inter-affiliate trade as a

percentage of total trade in the model. The results of these sensitivity tests show that
the interest of local partners (Variable 3), foreign exchange controls (Variable 4),
and good relationship with Chinese government (Variable 7) which are significant in
the original model remain significant at the 0.01 to 0.05 level. None of the newly
added variables in the above tests is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Finally, I deleted minimization of custom duties (Variable 2) from the model
to assess the effect of its moderate correlation with the income tax variable (Variable
1). The results of the reduced model are the same as the original model.

4.5

CONCLUSION
Despite expressed concerns about the significance of transfer pricing to the

economy of developing countries, there is limited empirical research addressing the
influence of environmental characteristics in these countries on MNCs’ choice of
transfer pricing methods. MNCs’ operations in developing countries are subject to
more economic, political and social risks due to the unique business environment in
these countries.

These factors provide inducements for MNCs to use transfer

pricing to maximize after-tax profits, to circumvent government restrictions, and to
reduce financial risks.
My study provides empirical evidence on how environmental variables
influence MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions in the context of the business
environment in China, a major developing economy. The analysis reveals that
management perceptions of nontax factors, namely, interest of local partners,
foreign exchange control and risks, and good relationships w ith local government
are important in discriminating the choice of transfer pricing methods. The greater
the importance of the interest of local partners as perceived by management, the
more likely that market-based transfer pricing methods will be used. These marketbased methods are considered more objective and fairer to both parties of joint
ventures as compared with cost-based methods. This finding is generally consistent
with previous studies that hold the view that a local partner in a joint venture plays a
monitoring role which restricts the latitude of transfer pricing strategy practiced by
foreign investors (Chan and Chow 1997b). My study also reveals that the greater
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the importance of foreign exchange control and risks as perceived by management,
the more likely that cost-based transfer pricing methods will be used, as cost-based
methods allow more flexibility for dealing with restrictive laws or regulations. Also,
the more important a good relationship with the local government as perceived by
management, the more likely that market-based transfer pricing methods will be
adopted to minimize disputes with government and tax authorities. Certain variables
such as restrictions on profit repatriation and risks of expropriation and
nationalization were not found to be important because it appears that these
problems have, to a certain extent, been solved by the Chinese government’s open
door policy. Other variables such as income tax rates and customs duties which are
of general relevance to all countries were not found to be significant in
discriminating between the choice of transfer pricing methods in China.
The literature on international transfer pricing is largely consistent with the
argument that MNCs exploit market imperfections in global markets emerging from
international socio-economic factors. This multinational transfer-pricing decisionmaking environment makes an assessment of the effect of these factors difficult. By
examining the environmental characteristics pertaining to China, this study sheds
empirical light on how the management perception of these characteristics
influences their choice of transfer pricing method. The findings of this study are of
particular relevance to developing countries in enhancing their understanding of
environmental influences on transfer pricing decisions, and thus contribute to the
building of a more comprehensive theoretical framework of transfer pricing in
developing economies. A limitation of this study is that the data are based on a
convenient sample of FIEs rather than a random sample, as FIEs in China would not
normally grant interviews on sensitive issues like transfer pricing without prior
personal contacts.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TAX AUTHORITIES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
When deciding on transfer pr ices, firms need to consider both the tax and nontax
costs involved. Given a particular set of environmental characteristics, management
would set transfer prices to achieve various conflicting objectives. Based on an
analysis of tax and nontax costs for firms with different characteristics, I hypothesize
that wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented
enterprises, and Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in
China are more motivated to shift profits out from China through transfer pricing
manipulation than equity joint ventures, domestic-market-oriented enterprises and
FIEs from other countries, respectively. Furthermore, the audit costs for wholly
foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented firms and
Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced FIEs are either smaller or similar to their counterparts.
Thus, they are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits by Chinese tax
authorities after controlling for the size of operations and the volume of inter-affiliate
transfers. To test my hypotheses, I examine the likelihood of transfer pricing audits
for 305 FIEs in China. Consistent with my prediction, I find that wholly foreignowned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are more
likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits in China. However, I do not find that
source of investment affects audit probability.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TAX AUTHORITIES

5.1

INTRODUCTION
Transfer pricing has long been a significant accounting, taxation and

management issue around the world. International transfer pricing is regarded as an
important mechanism for multinational corporations (MNCs) to maneuver funds
internationally and to choose the countries in which profits will be reported. MNCs
frequently use transfer pricing as a means of reducing global income tax payments.
A survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2001) finds that transfer pricing is rated as
the most important international tax issue by MNCs.
Empirical studies on transfer pricing mainly focus on the US, Japan and
other developed countries. A few studies on developing countries provide empirical
evidence on trading statistics to assess the extent of transfer pricing manipulation by
MNCs (Natke 1985; Rahman and Scapens 1986; Chan and Chow 1997a). Kim and
Miller (1979), Plasschaert (1985), and Chan and Chow (2001) focus on examining
transfer pricing policies and the importance of environmental variables for
companies operating in developing countries. They suggest that due to differences
in the business environment, tax factors which are important in developed countries
should not be over-rated in developing countries. Some nontax factors suc h as
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be
perceived as important in developed countries are considered as important in
developing countries. Empirical studies examining the trade -off between tax and
nontax factors for transfer pricing decisions in the business environment of
developing countries can enhance the understanding of MNC behavior in developing
economies.
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From the perspective of tax compliance studies, empirical research is limited.
Mills (1996, 1998) provides empirical evidence that proposed tax audit adjustments
by tax authorities increase when the difference between book income and taxable
income widens.

Chan and Chow (1997b) provide the first empirical study on

transfer pricing noncompliance by MNCs in China in the early 1990s. However,
they do not provide any multivariate analysis, nor do they specifically analyze the
tax and nontax cost trade -off for the MNCs. As explained later, they also do not
study the effect of activity orientation, profitability and volume of transfer on
transfer pricing noncompliance.
noncompliance during tax holidays.

Chan and Mo (2000) examine corporate
Chan and Mo (2002) further decompose

noncompliance into book-tax conforming and book-tax difference noncompliance,
and examine the tax and nontax cost trade-off on these two types of noncompliance.
However, they exclude transfer pricing noncompliance in their studies. Hence, this
is the first tax compliance study based on tax audits on MNCs, examining
empirically how the tax and nontax cost tradeoff affects international transfer
pricing.
Specifically, this study investigates empirically via multivariate statistical
analysis the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of being
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities. I use the tax and
nontax cost trade-off theory to explain why certain types of firm are more likely to
manipulate transfer prices and be selected for transfer pricing audits in China.
Based on the fin dings of Chapter 4, the major nontax factors affecting transfer
pricing decisions in China include relationships with the host government, interests
of local partners, and foreign exchange control and risks. In this chapter, I analyze
how these nontax factors are being considered against the tax factor and influence
MNCs’ decisions on profit shifting through transfer pricing manipulation.
84

The sample firms of my study are foreign investment enterprises (FIEs)
which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in
China. I hypothesize that equity joint ventures, as compared to wholly foreignowned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, have comparable tax cost but
higher nontax costs for shifting profits out of China due to the necessity of keeping a
good relationship with government and the monitoring effect of local partners.
Export-oriented FIEs, as compared to domestic-market-oriented enterprises, have
lower tariff costs and lower nontax costs for shifting profits out of China due to an
exemption from import tariffs for export production and less reliance on local
government and distributors. Export-oriented FIEs also have more opportunities for
transfer pricing manipulation. Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs, as compared
to FIEs from other sources, have both lower tax and nontax costs for shifting profits
out of China due to lower home countries’ tax rates and higher inside ownership
concentration.

Therefore, I expect that wholly foreign-owned enterprises,

cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented FIEs, and Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced
enterprises should have a greater incentive to evade tax through transfer pricing. As
such, they would be more likely to be audited by Chinese tax authorities for transfer
pricing transactions given that the audit cost is not significantly different for auditing
different types of FIEs and after controlling for the size of operations and the
possible tax amount that can be recovered. Based on a sample of 305 FIEs that
engaged in significant related-party transactions with overseas affiliates , I find that
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented
FIEs are more likely to be audited by Chinese tax authorities for transfer pricing
manipulation. These findings are consistent with my hypotheses developed based
on the tax and nontax cost trade-off theory.
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My study should have significant implications for tax authorities as well as
foreign investors operating in China and other developing economies. The results
should assist tax authorities in tackling tax audit problems more effectively and in
particular, setting tax audit guidelines on related-party transactions. For example,
given the low nontax costs of shifting profits out of China by export -oriented FIEs,
the tax authorities can set an audit priority for investigating this type of FIE which is
considered to be more likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulation.

My

research results should also help foreign investors gain a better understanding of tax
and nontax costs for transfer pricing manipulation in China. As this is the first
empirical study of tax and nontax cost trade-offs in an international transfer pricing
context, the results should also provide researchers with an interesting perspective in
studying the effect of nontax costs on transfer pricing manipulation.

Finally,

although China is unique in terms of its size and history, it is in essence a
developing economy according to IMF (2003). Thus, my research results of how
tax and nontax costs affect transfer pricing decisions and compliance should provide
a useful reference for other developing countries. For example, countries that have
comparable forms of investment as China can make reference to this research on
how different types of investment affect transfer pricing compliance.
The next section describes transfer pricing legislation and tax audit
development in China. Section 5.3 discusses the tax and nontax cost trade -off
theory. Section 5.4 formulates the research hypotheses. Section 5.5 explains the
research design.

Section 5.6 provides the empirical results, and Section 5.7

concludes the study.
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5.2

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
China has experienced rapid growth in GDP and foreign direct investment.

The average GDP growth rate in China was 9.1 percent for 1993-2003 compared
with 2.2 percent for the G-7 countries for the same period (IMF 2003). The foreign
direct investment inflow in China reached US$52.7 billion in 2002, a new record
reinforcing its position as the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the developing
world (UNCTC 2003). FIEs in China play an increasingly important role in China’s
foreign trade. In 2002, total imports and exports by FIEs accounted for, respectively,
54 percent and 52 percent of China’s total imports and exports (MOC 2003).
Among these imports and exports, a large volume of transactions represented
related-party transactions where the FIEs in China traded with their overseas
affiliated companies. Chan and Chow (1998) find that 88 percent of the exportoriented FIEs in China purchase and sell goods to their affiliated companies for 70
percent or more of their total imports and exports. Therefore, international transfer
pricing is an important issue in China for both the Chinese government and the
MNCs invested therein. As in other developing countries, tax evasion is also a
serious problem in China (Mo 2003). The Chinese tax authorities estimate that over
80 percent of MNCs operating in China evade taxes. This caused at least US$3.6
billion tax re venue losses in 2002 (PRN 2003). Transfer pricing manipulation is the
most common method used by MNCs for tax evasions.

5.2.1 Transfer Pricing Legislation in China
Transfer pricing provisions were first introduced as national legislation in
China under Article 13 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (Income Tax Law)
in 1991 by the National People’s Congress. Apart from the Income Tax Law, the
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State Administration of Taxation (SAT) issued a number of rules and regulations to
govern transfer pricing transactions in China including Guoshuifa (1992) No.237
and Guoshuifa (1998) No. 59. The principle of transfer pricing regulations in China
is based on the recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD 1979). The Income Tax Law stipulates that the payment or
receipt of charges in business transactions between an FIE in China and its
associated enterprises shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of
charges in business transactions between independent enterprises (i.e. the arm’s
length principle). Where the payment or receipt of charges is not made in the same
manner as business transactions between independent enterprises and results in a
reduction of taxable income, the tax authorities shall have the right to make
reasonable adjustments.

Currently, the adjusting methods include comparable

uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost-plus method, and other
appropria te methods (SAT 1998). China’s transfer pricing regulations in respect to
the definition of an associated company and burden of proof are similar to those
introduced by China’s major trading partners including the United States.

5.2.2 Transfer Pricing Audits in China
Since the early 1990s, transfer pricing audits have been considered one of the
most important tasks of the Chinese tax authorities. They find that a large number
of FIEs use related-party transactions to shift their profits out of China. According
to their records, on average, more than 60 percent of FIEs in China reported losses
during 1996 to 2002. Despite this, direct foreign investment continues to increase
rapidly in China. The SAT believes that many of the loss reporting FIEs manipulate
their transfer prices to reduce profits reported in China (Chinese Tax News 2002;
PRN 2003). To protect government revenues, the SAT puts anti-tax avoidance work
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as their top priority. Since China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001,
tariff rates have also been rapidly reduced. The average tariff rate was reduced from
36 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent in
2005. As such, the government revenue from tariffs will be decreased. The SAT is
required to increase its efforts on transfer pricing audits to collect more tax in order
to partly compensate for the loss of revenue from tariff reduction.
In 2001, the Chinese tax authorities increased assessable profits of FIEs by
US$49 million after transfer pricing audits, which is more than half of the total
amount adjusted for the previous five years (Chinese Tax News 2002). Regulations
which govern information exchange with foreign tax authorities for tax audits were
issued in 2001. Under these regulations, Chinese tax officials can exchange data
and information with other overseas tax authorities where the FIE’s associate
companies are located. Such arrangement helps the tax authorities collect audit
evidence and determine arm’s length prices for tra nsfer pricing audits. In recent
years, computerized databases were also set up in different provinces of China to
facilitate tax auditing.
How to select audit targets is one of the major concerns of tax authorities.
Obviously , tax authorities want to collect more tax revenue by auditing the noncompliant companies. This study empirically examines how tax and nontax costs
affect the motivation for transfer pricing manipulation and in turn the probability of
being selected for transfer pricing audits, given that audit costs incurred by tax
authorities for auditing different types of FIEs are similar.
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5.3

TAX AND NONTAX COST TRADE-OFF THEORY
A growing body of empirical tax research examines the coordination of tax

and nontax factors in business decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). Cloyd
(1995), Cloyd et al. (1996), and Mills (1998) investigate how expected tax costs of a
firm are influenced by the probability of being audited by tax authorities and the
probability of successfully defending tax positions. Mills and Newberry (2001)
examine the effect of nontax financial-reporting costs on the book-tax-reporting
choice. Chan and Mo (2002) examine the tax and nontax cost trade -off for exporters
and high-tech companies on book-tax conforming and book-tax difference
noncompliance. Hodder et al. (2003) examine how the tax and nontax cost trade -off
influences commercial banks’ conversion from C-corporation to S-corporation.
However, these empirical studies do not deal with issue of transfer pricing. Smith
(2002) provides an analytical study on transfer pricing dealing with the trade -off
between tax minimization and managerial performance evaluation. He finds that
such trade-off is necessary even if a firm adopts a dual pricing system or uses a nonprofit based performance evaluation method.

My study is different from the

previous studies mentioned above because I empirically examine transfer pricing
behavior based on actual tax audit cases and the “tax and nontax cost trade-off”
theory.

5.3.1 Tax Ince ntives for Transfer Pricing
Minimizing global tax liabilities is one of the most important goals of
transfer pricing.

When there are large differentials in income tax rates among

countries and a large volume of transfers, the incentive for MNCs to use transfer
pricing to shift income will be significant (Jacob 1996). For example, Klassen et al.
(1993) find evidence of income shifting by MNCs in response to tax rate changes in
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Canada, Europe and the United States. They find that with increasing Canadian tax
rates, MNCs shift income to the United States from Canada, whereas with
decreasing rates in Europe, they shift income to Europe from the United States.
Chan and Mo (2000) find that FIEs in a tax-exemption period are less likely to
underreport taxable income than FIEs in post-holiday and tax-reduction periods, i.e.
firms reduce their reported income when the tax rate increases. Although they do
not specifically investigate transfer pricing issues, their findings generally support
the income reporting/s hifting behavior for tax rate differentials. In Chapter 4 of my
thesis, I find that differences in income tax rates and minimization of custom duties
are important factors affecting MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions in China.
In China, the enterprise incom e tax rate is 30 percent with an additional 3
percent local tax. The Chinese government offers a basket of tax incentives and
reductions to FIEs.

For example, a preferential income tax rate of 15 percent is

granted to FIEs located in special economic zones and in economic and
technological development zones. For FIEs of a production nature scheduled to
operate for a period of not less than ten years, an exemption from taxation for the
first two profit-making years and a 50 percent tax reduction for the following three
years are granted. With the above generous tax incentives, China’s corporate income
tax rates applicable to FIEs are lower than those imposed by most of its major
trading and investing countries like the United States and Japan (Chan and Chow
1997b). Given the low tax rates in China as compared to their home countries, most
FIEs can shift their profits to China through transfer pricing in order to save global
tax payments and cash outflows. However, in practice, many FIEs shift their profits
out of China due to nontax considerations.
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5.3.2 Nontax Costs for Transfer Pricing
Kim and Miller (1979) and Plasschaert (1985) argue that the tax variable
should not be over-rated in transfer pricing policies in developing countries because
of the existence of nontax influences in these countries. Given a particular set of
environmental characteristics, management needs to achieve various objectives
through transfer pricing, including maximizing corporate profits, minimizing
financial risks and taking care of other behavioral and political aspirations. In
Chapter 4 of my thesis, I find that important nontax factors affecting transfer pricing
decisions of FIEs in China include interest of local partners, foreign exchange
control and risk, and good relationship with host government. Whether an FIE
would shift profits out of China depends on its trade -off between tax and nontax
costs affected by transfer pricing. From the viewpoint of a developing country, the
major concern is profits being illega lly shifted out of the country. This is also a
focus of my study.

5.3.3 Probability of Tax Audit
Tax compliance is often modeled as a game between taxpayers and tax
authorities. Tax authorities seek to maximize collections of tax revenue net of audit
costs (Graetz et al. 1986; Reingaum and Wille 1986; Beck and Jung 1989; Sansing
1993; Rhoades 1999). Tax authorities first identify companies which are likely to
evade tax and decide to audit those companies which can maximize the amount that
can be recovered net of audit costs.

Mills and Sansing (2000) find that tax

authorities are more likely to audit firms that have a positive book-tax difference
than firms that have no book-tax differences since a book-tax difference is a cue for
tax evasion. Rhoades (1999) suggests that the tax authorities will base their audit
decisions on the likelihood of misstatement of tax returns and the audit cost. Tax
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authorities observe the taxpayer’s reported income in the tax return, and based on
the likelihood that this reported income misstates the true tax liabilities make a
decision whether to audit the taxpayer’s report. To summarize, the probability that a
company will be selected for audit depends on the likelihood and the possible
amount of tax evasion, as well as the audit costs.

5.4

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

5.4.1 Forms of Investment
Joint ventures are a common form of investment in developing countries
because it is easier for foreign companies to enter into a new market with the help of
a local partner, and many developing countries restrict the establishment of wholly
foreign-owned enterprises, particularly in certain sensitive industries. There are two
types of joint ventures in China: equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures.
For equity joint ventures, foreign investors share profits and bear risks with local
partners in proportion to their equity ownership. The establishment of a cooperative
joint venture is based on a contract between the venture partners. Unlike equity
joint ventures, Chinese and foreign investors are able to contractually specify their
profit-sharing ratios, not necessarily according to their proportion of capital
contributions. Apart from joint ventures, another common form of business for FIEs
in China is wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
Under the Income Tax Law, all FIEs in China are subject to the same tax rate.
Thus, other things being equal, the tax cost for shifting profits out of China through
transfer pricing is similar for different forms of investment. Whether a particular
form of business in China is more likely to shift profits out would thus depend on
the nontax cost consideration of transfer pricing manipulation.
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Relationships with local partners is important for foreign investors of equity
joint ventures. Local partners can act as a bridge between the foreign investors and
local government , and can help to establish effective contacts with the local
distributors, suppliers, customers, and workers (Ambler and Witzel 2000) . Chinese
partners are equipped wit h local market information and have a good relationship
with the local government.

Up-to-date local market information can help the

ventures penetrate into the local Chinese market. Good relationships with the local
government is helpful to smooth business operations and to negotiate bureaucratic
hurdles. This is in part cultural and in part because the legal system in China is not
as transparent as that in most developed countries (Chan and Jiang 2002). Chapter 4
of my thesis finds that relationships with local partners is rated as one of the most
important variables by management of FIEs for choosing transfer pricing methods.
Chan and Chow (2001) suggest that transfer pricing manipulation increases the
conflict between local and foreign partners. The y find that in order to minimize
conflicts with local partners over transfer pricing, FIEs having a local partner in
management are more likely to use market-based transfer pricing methods and are
less likely to undertake transfer pricing manipulation.
On the other hand, some studies (Plasschaert 1985; Emmanuel and Mehafdi
1994) suggest that the existence of a local partner in a joint venture provides an
inducement for the foreign investors to use transfer pricing to shift profits out. By
shifting profits to parent companies, profits reported in China and in turn, the
amount shared by the local partners of equity joint ventures, is reduced. However,
equity joint ventures incur a high political cost for shifting profits out of China
because most of the local partners of the joint ventures are directly or indirectly
linked to the central or local governments or their agencies (Chan and Chow 1997b).
Therefore, manipulation of transfer prices by the foreign partners not only causes a
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loss of tax revenue for the Chinese government, but also a loss of the government’s
investment in the ventures. The Chinese government thus monitors the operations
of the ventures closely and puts serious effort into protecting their tax revenue and
investment. Executives of the local partners are also compensated and evaluated
based on performance of the joint ventures.

Local executives thus tend to be

actively involved in transfer pricing decisions to ensure the reasonableness of
transfer prices such that more objectively determined profits are reported by the
ventures.

Accordingly, equity joint ventures are less likely to manipulate their

transfer prices and shift profits out from China due to the high political cost and
performance evaluation incentives.
For cooperative joint ventures, many of the local partners may enter into a
management

contract

with

foreign

investors,

whereby

full

management

responsibility is delegated to the foreign partners who control the production and
financial functions of business operations. The local partners provide land and labor
for the ventures and in turn receive a fixed amount of fees. Thus, the monitoring
costs and conflicts with local partners are minimal for cooperative joint ventures as
long as the foreign partners pay the agreed fees according to the contract. Some of
the agreements of cooperative joint ventures also require the foreign partners to
transfer all their ownership of fixed assets to the Chinese partners at the end of the
agreement.

Such arrangements create a great inducement for transfer pricing

manipulation by foreign investors for a quick recovery of their investment (Chan
and Chow 1997b). Due to lower monitoring costs and greater inducement for
manipulating transfer prices, cooperative joint ventures are more likely to
manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out from China than equity
joint ventures.

Similarly, management of wholly foreign-owned enterprises has

absolute control of the FIEs. Compared with equity joint ventures, wholly foreign95

owned enterprises are not monitored by the local partners.

Therefore, wholly

foreign-owned enterprises have a higher degree of freedom to manipulate their
transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to achieve their corporate strategic
objectives (Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994).
In conclusion, equity joint ventures, compared with wholly foreign-owned
enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, have comparable tax costs but higher
nontax costs for shifting profits out of China through transfer pricing manipulation
due to the need for maintaining a good relationship with local partners and
government, and the monitoring effect of local partners. Therefore, it is expected
that wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures are more likely
to shift profits out of China through transfer pricing manipulation.
For reasons explained above and since local partners of equity joint ventures
may have good relationships with local governments, tax authorities foresee a
comparatively lower incentive and necessity to audit them. Furthermore, the costs
for auditing equity joint ventures may be higher because the local partners may have
some political influence on the tax officials which will affect their audit work (Chan
and Chow 1997b).

On the other hand, some may argue that due to good

relationships, the local partners would be more willing to provide information to the
tax authorities for audits which would in turn reduce the audit costs of the tax
authorities. However, in normal circumstances, whistle-blowing is unlikely as this
will be against the economic interests of the local partners. I believe that on the
whole, the form of investment does not significantly affect the audit costs of
investigating transfer pricing.

Therefore, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and

cooperative joint ventures are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits
by the Chinese tax authorities than equity joint ventures because of the higher
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probability of transfer pricing manipulation. Accordingly, the following hypothesis
is formulated.
Hypothesis 1:

Ceteris paribus, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and

cooperative joint ventures are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits
by the Chinese tax authorities than equity joint ventures.

5.4.2 Activity Orientation
Foreign investors that establish business operations in China have two
typical marketing objectives. One is to take advantage of cost savings in China and
export goods at more competitive prices to other countries. The other is to capitalize
on savings of transportation costs and tariffs for local production in order to
penetrate the domestic market (Chan and Mo 2002).

Maintaining a favorable

balance of payment s is one of the most important economic objectives for most
developing count ries due to their need for foreign exchange.

In China, the

government encourages export activities by FIEs and therefore provides numerous
supports for export-oriented companies including reduced tax rates, tax refunds,
simplified customs procedures, reduced land use fees, and other convenient services
(China Daily 2002). Raw materials, knock-down components, parts, accessories and
packaging materials imported for producing exports are exempt from import tariffs
in China. In other words, export-oriented FIEs are exempted from import duties for
materials or parts imported for producing exports. Therefore, export-oriented FIEs
can overprice imports to shift profits out from China without the trade -off of paying
more import tariffs in China. However, for domestic -market-oriented FIEs, if they
overprice import materials or parts for production of domestic sales, they need to
pay a higher amount of tariffs.

As such, the tariff costs of transfer pricing
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manipulation by domestic-market-oriented FIEs are higher than export-oriented
FIEs.
In order to encourage exports, the Chinese government also provides tax
incentives for export-oriented FIEs. For FIEs which export more than 70 percent of
their total sales , they can enjoy a 50 percent tax reduction in the year they qualify,
with a minimum tax rate of 10 percent. However, export -oriented FIEs still have to
pay the standard tax rate at the time of filing their tax return and receive tax refunds
only after verification of their total sales and export-sales documents by the Bureau
of Economic Development. Chan and Mo (2000, 2002) suggest that the outcome of
tax refunds is uncertain since many refund requests were rejected because of
inadequate documentation and sales manipulation. Therefore, FIEs do not know
whether they can get the tax refund when they decide the transfer prices during the
year.

Thus, corporate tax rate differences between export-oriented FIEs and

domestic-market-oriented FIEs should not significantly affect transfer pricing
decisions and prof it shifting activities.
On the other hand, export-oriented FIEs face higher foreign exchange risks
for keeping profits in China. FIEs in China that undertake foreign trade are required
to open a foreign exchange settlement account with a designated bank. For foreign
exchange received under the current account, FIEs may retain a certain amount of it
within the limit prescribed by State Administration of Exchange Control (SAFE).
Any excess portion must be sold to the designated banks. When the FIEs need to
make foreign currency payments, they can draw the required amount from the
foreign exchange settlement account. For export-oriented FIEs, as most of their
products are sold overseas, they are more likely to have a positive balance in the
foreign exchange settlement account and thus the amount exceeding the limit
prescribed by the SAFE must be sold to designated banks. This would then increase
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the foreign exchange risks of the FIEs. Therefore, export-oriented FIEs have a
greater incentive to shift profits out of China by over-pricing imports or underpricing exports in order to reduce the balance of the foreign exchange settlement
account and in turn, reduce the foreign exchange risks.
Export-oriented FIEs have priority in obtaining loans from the Bank of
China and other state-owned commercial banks in China (Barale 1988; USDOC
1999). Chan and Mo (2002) found that the role of financial statements in obtaining
financing is reduced for export-oriented FIEs, and thus their nontax cost of
underreporting book income and shifting profits out of China is lower.
Compared with domestic -market-oriented FIEs, export-oriented FIEs have a
more significant volume of inter-affiliate trade (Jacob 1996; Chan and Chow 1998),
and thus export-oriented FIEs have greater opportunity to manipulate their transfer
prices. For domestic -market-oriented FIEs, they need to sell their products in China.
Thus, they have a particularly important need to maintain good relationships with
local government and distributors because they rely heavily on the local distribution
network and local contacts to market their products. To avoid conflict with local
government and distributors in transfer pricing issues, domestic -market-oriented
FIEs are more likely to use market-based transfer pric ing methods (Chan and Chow
2001). Therefore, domestic-market-oriented FIEs have less room for manipulating
their transfer prices.
In conclusion, export-oriented FIEs have a greater incentive to transfer
profits out of China to reduce foreign exchange risks. They also have lower tariff
costs and nontax costs for reporting lower income in China than domestic -marketoriented FIEs. Thus, they are more motivated to evade tax through transfer pricing.
In addition, export-oriented FIEs are required to submit sales documents to the
Bureau of Economic Development to substantiate their export sales and total sales
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(i.e. the 70 percent requirement) in order to claim the tax refund. Since those
documents have already been verified by the Bureau of Economic Development, this
reduces the audit costs for tax authorities. Therefore, the audit cost for auditing
export-oriented FIEs should be lower than auditing domestic -market-oriented FIEs.
Hence, I anticipate that export-oriented FIEs have a higher probability of being
selected for audit by tax authorities. This expectation is reflected in the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, export -oriented FIEs are more likely to be
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities than domesticmarket-oriented FIEs.

5.4.3 Sources of Investment
The extent of global tax saving that can be obtained by MNCs through
transfer pricing manipulation depends on the tax rate differentials between the host
and the home countries. The major sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
China are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and the United States, totaling 60 percent of
FDI in China in 2002 (SSB 2003). The corporate tax rates of Hong Kong and
Taiwan are respectively 17.5 percent and 25 percent, which are relatively lower than
other countries like the United States and Japan (with marginal tax rates of 40
percent and 42 percent respectively). Therefore, Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs
would incur significantly lower tax costs for shifting profits out of China than other
countries. Some may argue that for companies that are subject to global tax with
full tax credit available, they cannot reduce their global tax liability by shifting
profits to home countries through transfer pricing. However, the tax on foreignsource income typically can be deferred until the income is repatriated to the home
countries. Therefore, in practice, the effective tax rate computed in a present value
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sense for income first taxed in China is typically lower than if the income were first
taxed in the home countries with higher income tax rates (Klassen et al. 1993). As
such, the tax cost for shifting profits out of Mainland China to Hong Kong and
Taiwan are lower compared with shifting profits to Japan and United States.
Performance evaluation is also an important consideration for setting transfer
prices. Management is less likely to manipulate transfer prices that would adversely
affect their compensation and performance evaluation even if such decisions are
beneficial to the companies. Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are often closely held,
owner-managed family businesses (Liu 1999). Klassen (1997) finds that high inside
ownership concentration reduces the need for accurate financial reporting.
Therefore, Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs have lower financial reporting costs for
underreporting profits since they have higher inside ownership structure and can
efficiently inform shareholders of the companies’ value through channels other than
financial statements. In addition, since Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are often
owner-managed or managed by relatives of the owners, the agency problems
between owners and management are minimal. Companies’ information including
the setting of transfer prices and their effect on FIEs’ profits can be efficiently
communicated from the management to owners, with few information asymmetry
problems. Thus, performance evaluation problems and management compensation
problems which would be caused by transfer pricing manipulation are reduced for
Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs. Given the lower nontax costs, I expect that Hong
Kong and Taiwan FIEs are more likely to shift profits out of China through transfer
pricing manipulation.
In conclusion, Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs have both lower tax and
nontax costs for shifting profits out of China through transfer pricing. In addition,
auditing Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs may be easier than auditing other
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sourced FIEs because of similar items in culture and language.

Audit costs

including translation costs for auditing Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs would
thus be lower.

Networking in Chinese communities should also facilitate

information exchange. Therefore, I expect that Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are
more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities
than other FIEs. The following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs are
more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits than other FIEs.

The comparative tax and nontax costs for shifting profit out of China by
different types of FIEs are summarized in Table 5.1.
[Insert Table 5.1 here]

5.5

RESEARCH METHOD

5.5.1 Data Collection
I collected the data from tax authorities in coastal China cities where FIEs
are concentrated. First, I requested the tax authorities to randomly select FIEs which
were audited for transfer pricing manipulation. In total, 111 cases were provided by
the tax authorities. All of the firms are in a post-holiday period or do not qualify for
tax holidays. Information such as the basis for tax adjustments, form of investment,
activity orientation, nationality of investors, amount of capital, sales and industry
were provided by the tax authorities.
Second, I requested the same tax authorities to randomly select FIEs that
have been established for more than five years, and have significant related-party
transactions (i.e. more than 50 percent of their total sales or purchases are sold to or
purchased from related companies), but which have not been selected for transfer
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pricing audits. By selecting FIEs that have been established for more than five years,
I exclude any FIEs that are newly established in my sample. Tax authorities may
have difficulties in targeting newly established FIEs for transfer pr icing audits as
they do not have a history of the FIEs’ profits and losses for analysis. In total, I
collected 194 non-audited FIEs that meet the selection requirements. Similar to the
audited sample, all of the firms are either in a post-holiday period or do not qualify
for tax holidays. Tax authorities provided information on the FIEs’ characteristics
including form of investment, activity orientation, nationality of investors, amount
of capital, sales, and industry.

5.5.2

Statistical Model
For testing my hypotheses, I used a logistic regression model as follows:

AUDIT = α0 +α1 FORM +α2 ACTIVITY +α3 SOURCE +α4 INDUSTRY
+α5 SIZE +α6 ROC + α7 RPT + ε
where:
Dependent Variables:
Audit

= 1, if an FIE was selected for transfer pricing audit by Chinese tax
authority, 0 otherwise;

Policy Variables:
Form

= 1, if an FIE is an equity joint venture, 0 otherwise;

Activity

= 1, if an FIE is an export-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise;

SOURCE

= 1, if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan, 0 otherwise.

Control Variables:
INDUSTRY = 1, if an FIE is in a industry that has a higher risk of transfer pricing
manipulation, 0 otherwise;
SIZE

= natural logarithm of FIE’s sales
103

ROC

= return on capital (i.e. profit before tax over total capital of the FIEs)

RPT

= volume of related-party transactions over sales

The dependent variable of the regression is a dichotomous variable to
identify the FIEs which were selected for transfer pricing audit by the Chinese tax
authorities

5.5.3 Control Variables
Prior studies on international transfer pricing in China have found that
certain specific industrial sectors are more likely to undertake transfer pricing
manipulation. Chan and Chow (1997a) reveal that Chinese FIEs in industries of
audio and video equipment, garment and textile, plastic products and chemicals tend
to over-price their imports and under-price their exports and thus generally report
lower profit. I interviewed six partners or senior managers of the Big Four CPA
firms who specialized in China tax and transfer pricing. They also suggested that
business engaged in certain types of industry like garments and textiles are more
likely to be selected by the Chinese tax authorities for tax audits. To control for the
potential effect of industries on the selection of transfer pricing audits, I introduced
“INDUSTRY” as a control variable for the regression. The dummy variable equals
1 if the FIEs are in the industries identified as having a high opportunity of transfer
pricing manipulation, and 0 for other industries.
Large firms usually have more complicated organizational structures than
small firms, and thus their inter-affiliate transactions are more complicated. Chan
and Chow (1997b) suggest that an audit of large MNCs is very costly and requires a
sophisticated audit unit. Therefore, audit costs for auditing large firms should be
significantly higher than for auditing small firms. I include “SIZE” by taking the
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natural logarithm of an FIE’s sales as a control variable to control for the potential
effect of size of business on audit costs and the selection of transfer pricing audits by
the Chinese tax authorities.
I also include a control variable “ROC” to control for the effect of
profitability of FIEs on the probability of being audited, as FIEs with persistent
losses or low profitability are more likely to be selected for audit. I use a variable
“RPT”, which is the ratio of the volume of related-party transactions to sales to
control for its effect on the probability of being audited. Tax incentive for profitshifting depends on the volume of related-party transactions (Jacob 1996). The
higher the volume of related-party transactions, the higher the tax incentive and the
higher the possible amount of tax evasion. Although the audit costs for auditing
firms with high proportion of inter -affiliate trades may be higher, I expect that FIEs
with high proportion of related-party transactions are more likely to be audited. This
is because the amount can be recovered net of audit costs for FIEs with higher
proportion of related-party transactions would be larger than those with low
proportion of related-party transactions.

5.6

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for the firm attributes of the 111
FIEs which were selected for in -depth transfer pricing audits and 194 FIEs which
were not selected for transfer pricing audits. The table shows that 86.5 percent of
the FIEs in the audited sample are wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative
joint ventures, 91.0 percent are export -oriented enterprises, and 82.9 percent are
sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan.

Table 5.2 also provides the results of

univariate tests for the comparison of distributions and means between the audited
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sample and non-audited sample.

I find that wholly foreign-owned enterprises,

cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented FIEs and Hong Kong and Taiwan
sourced FIEs are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits. The results
are consistent with my hypotheses and are similar to Chan and Chow (1997b)’s
findings which report that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint
ventures and Hong Kong sourced FIEs are more likely to be audited, but they do not
study activity orientation. For the control variables, I find that FIEs in identified
higher risk industries, firms with larger volume of sales, and firms have a higher
proportion of related-party transactions to sales are more likely to be selected for
transfer pricing audits. As related-party transactions include inter-affiliate purchases,
sales, loans and management fees, the mean “RPT” for the audited sample is 1.34
which is higher than sales.
[Insert Table 5.2 here]

5.6.2 Logistic Regression
Table 5.3 reports logistic regression results for the likelihood that an FIE
with different firm characteristics will be selected for transfer pricing audits by the
Chinese tax authorities. Overall, the model correctly predicts 87.2 percent of the
selection for transfer pricing audits. The results of logistic regression confirm that
form of investment and activity orientation are significant corporate attributes
affecting the probability of being selected for transfer pricing audits in China. The
signs of the coefficients are consistent with my hypotheses.

Specifically,

cooperative joint ventures, wholly foreign owned FIEs, and export -oriented FIEs
have lower nontax costs for shifting profits out of China and this contributes to a
higher probability of being selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax
authorities.

Smaller firms and firms with a larger proportion of related-party
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transactions are also more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits because of
lower audit costs for auditing smaller firms, and greater incentives or more
opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation for firms that have a higher
proportion of related-party transactions. However, my multivariate analysis did not
find that the source of investment significantly affects the probability of being
selected for transfer pricing audits. Variance inflation factors are all less than 2,
meaning that multi-collinear ity is unlikely to affect my inferences.
[Insert Table 5.3 here]

I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results.
First, I changed the variable “SOURCE” from signifying “Hong Kong and Taiwan
source FIEs” to “Hong Kong FIEs” to see whether a different tax system would
affect my results since Hong Kong charges corporate taxes only on local sourced
income. Second, I replaced the variable “ROC” by a variable “PROFIT” which is
defined as net profit before tax over sales. Thir d, I replaced the “ROC” variable by
a dummy variable representing whether the FIEs report losses or profits in their
accounts, and fourth, by a dummy variable representing whether the FIEs have
consistent losses or low profitability. Fifth, I replaced sales volume by registered
capital for controlling the firm size. Sixth, I changed the definition of “RPT” to the
natural logarithm of the volume of related-party transactions. Seventh, I included a
dummy variable of the choice of transfer pricing method in the model. Eighth, I
included an interaction term of “EXPORT” and “RPT” in the model. Ninth, I
excluded six audited cases which involved in transfer of intangible in the regression.
The results of the above sensitivity tests are similar to the results of the original
model, except in (i) the second and forth tests where the significant level of the
variable “FORM” changes from 5 percent to 10 percent, (ii) in the fifth test, where
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the control variable “RPT” becomes insignificant and “ROC” becomes signif icant at
the 5 percent level, and (iii) in the eighth test, the significant level of the variable
“EXPORT” changes from 5 percent to 10 percent.

5.7

CONCLUSION
This

study

investigates empirically

the

relationship

between

firm

characteristics of FIEs in C hina and the probability of being selected for transfer
pricing audits based on a modified tax and nontax cost trade -off theory. I found that
equity joint ventures and domestic-market-oriented FIEs have higher nontax cost
than their counterparts for shifting profits out of China through manipulating
transfer prices mainly because of the need to keep a good relationship with local
partners and government. Export-oriented FIEs also have higher tax benefits for
shifting profits out of China than domestic-market-oriented FIEs because of
exemption of import tariffs for export goods.

Thus, wholly foreign-owned

enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are more likely to
manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to achieve their
strategic objectives.

My empirical results are consistent with the theoretical

predictions.
My study is useful for tax authorities in developing economies as it provides
evidence on how firm characteristics affect tax and nontax costs of shifting profits
out of a developing economy. These findings should be useful for the tax authorities
in these economies in designing tailor -made tax audit guidelines and in the selection
of transfer pricing audit targets.

A study of tax and nontax costs involved in

international transfer pricing manipulation allows us to understand more about the
incentives and disincentives for MNCs to comply with transfer pricing regulations.
Public policy makers should then design legislation to increase incentives for
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compliance or reduce disincentives. For example, policy makers should set policies
which would reduce the foreign exchange risks and thus the incentive to shift profits
out of China by export -oriented FIEs. Management of MNCs can also gain a better
understanding of how firm characteristics affect their transfer pricing decisions in
China.
Finally, for academic research, this study provides new insight on how the tax
and nontax cost trade-off theory can explain the way management balances the often
conflicting transfer pricing objectives and the probability of MNCs being audited on
transfer pricing. It helps researchers in assessing the suitability and robustness of
the tax and nontax cost theory in explaining tax audits on international transfer
pricing.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER SUMMARY
This thesis provides comprehensive analysis of international transfer pricing in
China. It extends prior studies by examining how management’s perception of the
relative importance of environmental variables affects the ir choice of transfer
pricing methods within a developing economy framework. This thesis also provides
the first tax compliance study based on tax audits on MNCs, examining empirically
how the tax and nontax cost tradeoff affects international transfer pricing decisions.
The results reveal that management perception of nontax factors, namely,
interests of local partners, foreign exchange control and risks , and good relationships
with local government, are important in discriminating between choices of transfer
pricing methods. I also find that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative
joint ventures and export -oriented FIEs are more likely to manipulate their transfer
prices and shift their profits out from China to achieve their strategic objectives.
The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Future research
can investigate the related-party transactions entered between the management and
the companies themselves, which are very common in developed countries. Studies
on the transfer pricing issues between Chinese state-owned enterprises and their
listed companies should also be contributory.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
6.1

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Prior studies examined the transfer pricing methods commonly used by

MNCs in developed countries and the role of certain important environmental
variables in their transfer pricing considerations.

The perceived importance of

environmental variables reflects management’s trade -off on a number of conflicting
objectives of transfer pricing, and thus influences their decisions on choosing among
transfer pricing methods.

My thesis extends prior studies by examining how

management’s perception of the relative importance of various environmental
variables affects their choice of transfer pricing methods in China under a
developing economy framework.

The analysis of my data reveals that

management’s perception of three environmental variables, namely, the interests of
local partners, foreign exchange control, and the maintenance of a good relationship
with the host government are significant to discriminate FIEs’ choice of transfer
pricing methods. The more important the management perceives the interest of
local partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host gover nment,
the more likely that an FIE will use a market-based transfer pricing method. The
more important the management perceives foreign exchange controls, the more
likely a cost-based transfer pricing method will be used. Overall, there is a moderate
agr eement between US and non-US FIEs on the relative importance of the
environmental variables studied.
In addition, my thesis provides the first tax compliance study based on tax
audits of MNCs, examining empirically how the tax and nontax cost trade -off
affects international transfer pricing. The analysis of my data reveals that wholly
foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are
111

more likely to manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to
achieve respective strategic objectives. Equity joint ventures and domestic -marketoriented FIEs have higher nontax costs than their counterparts for shifting profits out
of China through manipulating transfer prices mainly because of the need to keep a
good relationship with local partners and government. Export-oriented FIEs also
have higher tax benefits for shifting profits out of China than domestic -marketoriented FIEs mainly because of the exemption of import tariffs for export goods.

6.2

IMPLICATIONS
The findings of this thesis are of particular relevance to developing countries

in enhancing our understanding of environmental influences on transfer pricing
decisions, and thus contribute to the building of a more comprehensive theoretical
framework of transfer pricing in developing economies. Results of this study should
also have significant implications for tax authorities as well as foreign investors
operating in China and other developing economies. The results should help tax
authorities to tackle the tax audit problems more effectively and in setting auditing
guidelines on related-party transactions. For example, given the low nontax costs of
shifting profits out of China by export -oriented FIEs, tax authorities can set audit
priority for investigating this type of FIEs. In addition, my research results should
help foreign investors to have a better understanding of the tax and nontax factors
for transfer pricing decisions in China. For example, management can consider the
relative importance of these factors in setting or revising their transfer pricing
policies. This research should be of interest to academic researchers interested in
international accounting as it contributes to building a more comprehensive theory
of environmental influences on international transfer pricing. This research is also
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the first study to provide an empirical assessment based on tax audits of the tax and
nontax cost trade-off theory as it applies to international transfer pricing.

6.3

LIMITATIONS
A limitation of this study is that the data as summarized in Chapter 4 was

collected based on a convenience sample of FIEs rather than a random sample, as
FIEs in China would not normally grant interviews on sensitive issues like transfer
pricing without prior per sonal contacts. In addition, as China is unique due to its
rapid economic growth rate and large population, the findings of this research
should not be generalized to other developing countries without considering the
business environment of each country.

Having said that, China is essentially a

developing country and is classified as such by the IMF (2003). Therefore, the
findings of this research should be considered as a useful reference tool for other
developing economies in enhancing their understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing
behaviors. For example, countries that have similar forms of investment as China
can make a reference on how different types of investment affect transfer pricing
compliance.

6.4

FUTURE EXTENSIONS OF THIS RESEARCH
My study mainly focuses on international transfer pricing for inter -company

transactions (i.e. the transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, and
transactions among the subsidiaries). Future research can investigate related-party
transactions between companies and their management. This type of related-party
transaction is very common in developed countries. For example, Apple Computer
Inc. paid its chief executive Steven Jobs nearly US$1.2 million to reimburse him for
costs he incurred using his personal jet on company business in 2001 and 2002.
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Actually, many US companies have side deals involving private planes of their
executives. Ford Motor Co. paid two of its directors hundreds of thousands of
dollars in consulting fees (Emshwiller 2003). These are just a few examples of this
type of related-party transaction. Such transactions introduce conflicts of interest
since management is acting on behalf of the shareholders, but at the same time, they
are also involved in business transactions with the companies. Management of the
holding companies often have business deals with the company’s subsidiaries in
other jurisdictions. In many cases, these transactions cross national boundaries.
Future research can analyze the extent of this type of related-party transaction in
China and Hong Kong, how agency theory can be applied to explain this type of
transaction, and how these transactions affect stock returns.
Future research can also investigate transfer pricing issues in Chinese stateowned enterpr ises (SOEs). China implemented the SOE reforms in the 1990s.
Many SOEs organized their operations into profit centers and introduced
performance-based reward systems. There are numerous transactions between these
profit centers. The centers that performed well were allowed to raise capital in the
security markets. Thus, policies of intra-firm transfers become a significant issue
for China. Future research can study how the management of SOEs decides on their
transfer pricing methods, and analyze the factors which have a potential influence on
their transfer pricing decisions. Strictly speaking, this type of transaction mainly
involves domestic transfer pricing. However, SOEs often have overseas subsidiaries
including those in Hong Kong and some are listed companies in China, Hong Kong
and overseas. Therefore, international transfer pricing can be an important variable
in affecting capital market behaviors for Chinese listed companies.

114

Table 1.1
Average Annual Percentage Growth of Real GDP
Countries/
Region
World
G-7 countries
US
Germany
Japan
China

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2.2
1.3
2.7
-1.1
0.5
13.5

3.7
3.1
4.0
2.3
1.0
12.6

3.7
2.4
2.7
1.7
1.8
10.5

4.1
2.0
3.6
0.8
3.5
9.6

4.3
2.7
4.4
1.4
1.9
8.8

2.8
2.5
4.3
2.0
-1.1
7.8

3.6
2.7
4.1
2.0
0.2
7.1

4.7
3.5
3.8
2.9
2.8
8.0

2.3
1.2
0.3
0.6
0.4
7.3

3.0
1.4
2.4
0.2
0.3
8.0

Source: IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2001, 2003. World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C.: IMF.
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2003
Projection
3.2
1.5
2.2
0.5
0.8
7.5

Average
1993-2002
3.4
2.3
3.2
1.3
1.1
9.3

Table 1.2
Value and Annual Growth of China’s Foreign Trade

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Value
(US$bn)
195.70
236.62
280.85
289.90
325.16
324.05
360.63
474.29
509.76
620.77
851.21

Total Trade
Growth (%)
18.2
20.9
18.7
3.2
12.2
-0.3
11.3
31.5
7.5
21.8
37.1

Ranking in
the world
11
11
11
11
11
11
9
7
6
4
5

Value
(US$bn)
91.74
121.01
148.77
151.07
182.79
183.81
194.93
249.20
266.15
325.60
438.37

Export
Growth (%)
8.0
31.9
22.9
1.5
21.0
0.6
6.0
27.8
6.8
22.3
34.6

Value
(US$bn)
103.96
115.61
132.08
138.83
142.37
140.24
165.70
225.09
243.61
295.17
412.84

Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2003. China Statistical Yearbook 2003. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.
United nations. 2000, 2003. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Nov 2000, Oct 2003). New York: United Nations.
2003 data from www.mofcom.gov.cn
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Import
Growth (%)
29.0
11.2
14.2
5.1
2.5
-1.5
18.2
35.8
8.2
21.2
39.9

Table 1.3
The Top Ten Largest Recipients of Direct Foreign Investment in the World
1997
Countries
US$M
US
103 398
China
44 237

Countries
US
UK

US$M
174 434
74 324

3
4

UK
France

33 229
23 174

China
Netherlands

43 751
36 964

5
6
7
8

Brazil
Mexico
Germany

18 993
14 044
12 244
11 998

France
Brazil
Germany
Canada

9

Canada

11 527

10

Hong Kong

11 368

Ranking
1
2

Belgium and
Luxembourg

1998

1999
Countries
US

2000

2001

US$M
283 376
133 059

Countries
US

UK
Sweden

87 973
60 850

Germany
UK

30 984
28 856
24 593
22 809

Germany
France
Netherlands
China

54 754
47 070
47 289
40 319

Canada
Hong Kong
Netherlands
China

66 617
61 938
52 453
40 772

Belgium and
Luxembourg

22 691

Brazil

28 578

Spain

Sweden

19 564

Canada

24 435

Brazil

Belgium and
Luxembourg

Belgium and
Luxembourg

US$M
300 912
245 561

Countries
US
UK

195 122
116 552

France

2002
US$M
124 435
53 799

Countries

52 623
50 996

France
Germany

51,505
38,033

Netherlands
China
Germany
Mexico

50 471
46 846
31 833
24 731

US
Netherlands
UK
Spain

30,030
29,182
24,945
21,193

37 523

Hong Kong

22 834

Canada

20,595

32 779

Brazil

22 457

Ireland

19,033

Belgium and
Luxembourg

Luxembourg*

China

Source: UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation). 2002, 2003. World Investment Report. New York: United Nations
Note: It is estimated that about 80% of the FDI inflow in Luxembourg in 2003 is transshipped investment which have little economic impact in the country.
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US$M
125,660
52,700

Table 1.4
Import and Export by Foreign Investment Enterprises in China
Total Trade
Value
Growth
(US$bn)
(%)
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

67.07
87.64
109.82
137.11
152.62
157.68
174.51
236.71
259.10
330.23
472.25

53.4
30.7
25.3
24.8
11.3
3.3
10.7
35.6
9.5
27.5
43.0

Value
(US$bn)
25.24
34.71
46.88
61.51
74.90
80.96
88.63
119.44
133.24
169.99
240.34

Export
% of
China’s total
export
27.5
28.7
31.5
40.7
41.0
44.0
45.5
47.9
50.1
52.2
54.8

Growth
(%)

Value
(US$bn)

45.4
37.5
35.1
31.2
21.8
8.1
9.5
34.8
11.6
27.6
41.4

41.83
52.93
62.94
75.6
77.72
76.72
85.88
117.27
125.86
160.25
231.91

Import
% of
China’s total
import
40.2
45.8
47.7
54.5
54.6
54.7
51.8
52.1
51.7
54.3
56.2

Growth
(%)
58.6
26.5
18.9
20.1
2.8
-1.3
11.9
36.6
7.3
27.3
44.7

Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 1997, 2000, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.
2003 data from www.mofcom.gov.cn
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Table 2.1
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies
Article
Methodology Sample
Tang and Chan Questionnaire 76 US companies in
(1979)
survey
the Fortune 500 and
Fortune Second 500;
and 50 Japanese
companies in the
President Directory

Objective of Study
Rate the importance of
different environmental
variables on transfer pricing
decisions.

Major Results
Five environmental variables rated as most important by US firms are
overall profit to the company, restrictions on repatriation of profits,
competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, differentials in income tax
rates and income tax legislation among countries, and performance
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. Five environmental variables rated as
most important by Japanese firms are overall profit to the company,
competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, devaluation and revaluation
in countries where the company has operations, restrictions on
repatriation of profits imposed by foreign countries, and performance
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. Variables most able to discriminate
between US and Japan are interest of local partners, devaluation and
revaluation of foreign currencies, antidumping legislation, import
restrictions imposed by foreign countries, and differentials in income tax
rates and income tax legislation among countries.

Burns (1980)

Examine the importance of
various environmental
variables on transfer pricing
by asking the financial
executives to rate the
variables.

Market conditions in foreign countries, competition in foreign countries,
reasonable profit for foreign affiliates, US federal income taxes, and
economic conditions in foreign countries are rated as most important
environmental variables among the others.

Questionnaire 62 US-based MNCs
survey
in Fortune 500
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Table 2.1 (cont.)
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies
Article
Tang (1981)

Methodology
Questionnaire
survey and
interviews

Mostafa et al.
(1984)

Questionnaire 46 UK companies
survey

Borkowski
(1992)

Sample
145 US MNCs, 102
Japanese MNCs, 192
Canadian MNCs, and
80 UK MNCs

Objective of Study
Rate the importance of
different environmental
variables and test whether
there is significant difference
on the importance of these
variables for different
nations.

Examine whether there is
significant difference in the
importance of environmental
variables for the firms using
different transfer pricing
methods.
Questionnaire 247 US MNCs in the Examine whether
survey
Fortune 500 or the
organizational characteristics
Business Week 1000 and environmental factors
affect the choice of transfer
pricing methods.
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Major Results
Overall profits to the company and the competitive position of
subsidiaries in foreign countries are considered the most important
variables by all four national groups. The interests of local partners in
foreign subsidiaries is ranked substantially higher by UK and Japanese
firms than by Canadian and US companies. Compared with the other
national groups, Japanese companies place significantly greater
importance on the devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies.
The perceived importance of the 20 environmental variables selected
including overall profit of the company, divisional autonomy, and
compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations are significantly
relates to the international transfer pricing methods used.

The choice of a transfer pricing method is affected by specific
organizational and environmental characteristics, but not upon the
nature of the transfer. Stability and favorableness of the parent
company’s economic circumstances are significant environmental
factors which would affect transfer pricing decisions.

Table 2.1 (cont.)
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies
Article
Klassen et al
(1993)

Methodology Sample
Financial
191 US MNCs
statement
data from
annual reports

Objective of Study
Evaluate changes in the
reporting of taxable income
by US MNCs in response to
the changes in income tax
rates.

Major Results
With increasing Canadian tax rates, MNCs shift income to the United
States from Canada, whereas with decreasing rates in Europe, they shift
income to Europe from the United States.

Tang (1993)

Questionnaire 78 US companies in
survey
Fortune 500

Rate the importance of
different environmental
variables on transfer pricing
decisions.

Overall profit to the company is the most important environmental
variables for US MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions. Compared with
Tang (1979), management ranked differentials in income tax rates and
income tax legislation among countries, maintaining good relationship
with host governments, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to
seek local funds, and antitrust leg islation of foreign countries as more
important on transfer pricing decisions.

Cravens and
Questionnaire 82 US MNCs
Shearon (1996) survey

Examine how transfer pricing Number of countries of operations and the dollar value of transfers are
policies affect financial
significant factors to explain the total tax burden of MNCs. Value of
results.
transfers and the foreign sales percentage have an effect on the financial
outcomes of the firm as measured by return of assets.

Jacob (1996)

Investigate the relationships
between the volume of
intrafirm sales, differential of
tax rates and tax payments.

Financial
260 US firms for the
statement
period of 1982-1984
data from
and 289 US firms for
annual reports the period of 19881990
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Firms with substantial intrafirm transfers paid lower global taxes, lower
US taxes in the period of 1982-1984 (i.e. when foreign tax rates were
lower than US tax rates) and higher US taxes in the period of 1988-1990
(i.e. when US tax rates were lower than foreign tax rates).

Table 2.1 (cont.)
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies
Article
Borkowski
(1997a)

Methodology Sample
Questionnaire 39 Japanese MNCs
survey
and 28 US MNCs

Objective of Study
Examine whether
organization factors,
environmental factors and
financial factors would affect
the choice of transfer pricing
methods.

Major Results
The choice of transfer pricing methods is affected by differences in
environmental and financial factors, but not by organization factors.
Environmental variables including the risk of audits by tax authorities
and the market conditions in subsidiary countries have significant
impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods.

Borkowski
(1997b)

Questionnaire 28 Canadian MNCs
survey
with US subsidiaries
and 62 US MNCS
with Canadian
subsidiaries

Examine the importance of
different environmental
variables on transfer pricing
decisions.

Canadian and US MNCs have similar views on the importance of
different environmental variables on transfer pricing decisio ns.
Economic conditions of Canadian and risk of audits by US tax
authorities are significant factors affecting the choice of transfer pricing
methods.

Oyelere and
Emmanuel
(1998)

Financial
36 foreign-controlled
statement
enterprises operating
data from
in the UK and 36
annual reports UK-controlled
enterprises

Examine the possible use of
international transfer pricing
as an income shifting
mechanism by foreigncontrolled enterprises
operating in the UK.

Foreign-controlled enterprises have lower profitability and higher
dividend distribution than UK-controlled enterprises. This provides
evidence that foreign-controlled enterprises in UK shift income through
international transfer pricing.
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Table 2.1 (cont.)
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies
Article
Conover and
Nichols (2000)

Methodology Sample
Financial
490 US firms for the
statement
period of 1982-1984
data from
and 657 US firms for
annual reports the period of 19881990

Objective of Study
Evaluate the effect of firm
size on income shifting
between tax jurisdictions
through the use of transfer
prices both before and after
the passage of the US Tax
Reform Act of 1986.

Major Results
Smaller and financially distressed firms are less likely to shift income
through transfer pricing than larger firms.

Kachelmeier
and Towry
(2002)

Experimental 48 MBA students
study

Expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual
negotiations when participants negotiate over a computer network with
no communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances. Conversely,
both expectations and ac tual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based
price concessions when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting
with unrestricted communication.

Tang (2002)

Questionnaire 95 US MNCs in
survey
Fortune 1000

Examine whether the
expectations of fairnessbased price concessions
extend to the actual prices
that result from real-cash
negotiation by using an
experimental study.
.
Rate the importance of
different environmental
variables on transfer pricing
decisions.
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Transfer pricing regulations and other tax rules in the United States is
the most important variable for ranking transfer pricing decisions,
followed by overall profit to the company.

Table 2.2
Prior International Transfer Pricing Research in Developing Economies
Article
Lall (1973)

Methodology Sample
Empirical
Import data of 14
study
foreign firms in
Colombia

Objective of Study
Provide evidence on the use
of transfer pricing in
Colombia.

Major Results
MNCs in Colombia over -priced their imports by 33 percent to 300
percent in the pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in
the rubber and electrical industries.

Investigate the effect of
environmental variables on
transfer pricing decisions of
MNCs in developing
countries.

Profit repatriation restrictions and exchange control within the foreign
subsidiary country are most important for transfer pricing decisions in
these developing countries. The tax variables, that is, income tax
liability within the host country and within the US only rank the fifth
and the sixth.

Kim and Miller Empirical
(1979)
study

Questionnaire survey
of 30 US parent firms
with at least one
subsidiary in two of
the eight specified
countries (i.e. Korea,
Malaysia,
Philippines, Taiwan,
Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru)

Natke (1985)

Import data of 141
Investigate whether MNCs
MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the prices of
manufacturing firms pay higher import prices than MNCs’ imports also exhibit greater variability.
operating in Brazil
Brazillian firms due to
transfer pricing manipulation.

Empirical
study
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Table 2.2 (cont.)
Prior International Transfer Pricing Research in Developing Economies
Article
Plasschaert
(1985)

Methodology Sample
Analytical
N/A
study

Objective of Study
Explore whether policies and
regulations in less developed
countries are such that the
temptations for the MNCs to
practice transfer pricing
manipulation are stronger
than is the case in more
developed cou ntries.

Majo r Results
Less developed countries typically impose more restrictions on the
MNCs than is the case in more developed countries. Import duties and
exchange controls are also important environmental variables to induce
transfer pricing manipulation in less developed countries. Moreover,
less developed countries generally have fewer measures to uncover and
to redress transfer pricing manipulation since they are less well
equipped for the task. Therefore, inducements for MNCs to resort to
transfer pricing manipulation in developing countries are stronger than
in developed countries.

Rahman and
Empirical
Scapens (1986) study

Import data of 20
Determine whether MNCs in MNCs over-priced imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and
MNCs in Bangladesh Bangladesh price imports
600 percent.
from related sources at higher
prices.

Chan and Chow Empirical
(1997a)
study

238 imported
commodities and
1,062 exported
commodities

Provide evidence that foreign MNCs in China over-priced imports and under -priced exports in the
investors shift profits out of audit/video equipment, garment, plastic and chemicals industries.
China by the transfer pricing
mechanism.
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Table 2.3
Prior Research on Tax Compliance
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Major Results

Rationale for the results

Mills (1998)

Empirical
study

1500 manufacturing
firms in
Coordinated
Examination
Program of US IRS

Examine whether firms
can manage tax and
financial accounting
income separately (i.e. no
trade-off betw een tax and
financial reporting).

IRS proposed audit
adjustments increase as the
excess of book income
over taxable income
increases.

GAAP tend to be conservative. But
the primary role of tax legislation is
revenue-raising. Certain provisions
of the tax law are designed to
increase revenues and decrease
deductions. Thus, the more book
income exceeds taxable income, the
stronger the evidence the IRS may
have that the firm has been aggressive
in its tax reporting.

Chan and
Empirical
Chow (1997b) study

81 FIEs being
audited by Chinese
tax authorities on
related-party
transactions in early
1990s

Examine whether certain Higher proportion of
FIEs are more li kely to be wholly foreign-owned
selected for transfer
enterprises, cooperative
pricing audits by tax
joint ventures and Hong
authorities using univariate Kong sourced FIEs are
analysis
selected for transfer
pricing audits.

Chan and Mo
(2000)

585 FIEs being
Examine how the taxaudited by Chinese holiday position affects
tax authorities, but noncompliance in China.
excludes transfer
pricing audits

Empirical
study

Companies are least
compliant before entering
a tax holiday, and most
compliant while in taxexemption period
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Significance and
Implication
Firms cannot manage tax
and financial accounting
income separately and
cannot have unlimited
level of book-tax
differences.

Wholly foreign-owned enterprises
and cooperative joint ventures have
more freedom on transfer pricing
decisions due to the lack of local
partners in the management.

Firm characteristics affect
the probability of being
selected for transfer
pricing audits.

FIEs have incentives to exaggerate
losses during the pre-holiday period
to delay the start of tax holiday and
thus they are lest compliant. FIEs are
most ompliant while in tax-exemption
period because FIEs do not have an
incentive to evade tax since they are
exempted from tax.

Tax rates and tax
incentives affect firms’
tax noncompliance
behavior.

Table 2.3 (cont.)
Prior Research on Tax Compliance
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Chan and Mo
(2002)

Empirical
study

Examine the tax and
nontax cost trade-off for
exporters and high-tech
companies when they
under-report both book
and taxable incomes.

256 tax audits in
China, excluding
transfer pricing
audits

Major Results

Significance and
Implication
Export -oriented and high - Export-oriented FIEs have special tax Firm characteristics affect
tech firms have larger
incentives and priority in obtaining
firms’ tax noncompliance
book-tax-conforming tax loans. Thus, they have greater tax
behavior.
audit adjustments than
benefits and lower nontax costs of
domestic-market-oriented underreporting book and tax incomes.
and non-high -tech firms. High-tech FIEs have less reliance on
Domestic-market-oriented reported profits for performance
and non-high -tech firms
evaluation and obtaining loans. Thus,
have larger book-tax
they have lower nontax costs of
difference adjustments.
underreporting book and tax incomes.
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Rationale for the results

Table 2.4
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Cloyd (1995)

Experimental
study

72 experienced tax Examine the effects of tax
professionals in US and financial accounting
conformity on the tax
preparers’
recommendations of tax
treatment.

Cloyd et al.
(1996)

Empirical
study

Questionnaire
survey from 600
financial executives
of public and
private firms in US

Major Results
Book-tax conformity
increases tax preparers’
subjective probabilities of
successfully defending
aggressive tax positions
and thus more of them
would recommend
aggressive tax treatment.

Examine whether
Conformity is more likely
management is more likely if the probabilities of
to choose conformity when successfully defending the
expected tax savings
aggressive tax position can
increase and less likely to be increased. Public-firm
choose conformity for
managers are less likely to
public firms.
choose book-tax
conformity than privatefirm managers.
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Rationale for the results

Significance and
Implication
Taxpayers need to disclose
Book-tax conformity
inconsistencies between financial and reduces tax audit costs
tax accounting treatments. IRS audit predicted by tax
guidelines instruct examiners to
preparers.
reconcile taxable income from book
income. Thus, preparers may believe
that large book-tax difference will
alert the IRS. Besides, financial
accounting choice should reflect the
facts and circumstances. Therefore, it
is more difficult to defend for booktax different treatments.
Conformity increases expected tax
Book-tax conformity
saving by increasing the probabilities reduces tax audit costs
of successfully defending tax
because it decreases the
positions. However, conformity
risk of being audited and
results in lower reported profits and the difficult y of
this would increase nontax costs (eg. defending tax positions,
debt covenant violations, reduced
but conformity increases
compensation, perceived negative
costs for financial
capital market consequences). The
reporting purposes
expected tax savings must be
because decrease tax
balanced against the nontax costs.
income would also
Public firms face higher levels of
decrease financial
nontax costs and thus they are less
reported income.
likely to choose conformity.

Table 2.4 (cont.)
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Major Results

Guenther et al. Empirical
(1997)
study

66 listed firms in US Examine the impact of
plus 66 control firms book-tax conformity on
firm’s financial reporting
and tax planning
strategies

Required use of accrual
method for tax purposes
causes firms to defer
income for financial
statement purposes.

Klassen
(1997)

327 divestitures from Examine the influences of
285 firms listed in
inside ownership
US
concentration on the
trade-off between
financial reporting and
tax reporting incentives.

Firms with lower levels of
inside ownership
concentration realize larger
financial reporting gains or
smaller financial reporting
losses than firms with
higher levels of
concentration.

Empirical
study
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Rationale for the results

Significance and
Implication
Firms can maximize book earnings Increasing book-tax
without increasing tax payments if
conformity causes firms
they use cash method for tax
to defer income to
reporting. Due to the change of
deferring tax payment
using accrual method for tax
even if this would result
purposes, firms have less incentive to in lower income for
accelerate revenue and defer
financial reporting
expenses in the post change periods purpose.
than in the pre-change periods
because this would accelerate tax
payments.
Lower inside ownership
concentration will lead to increased
emphasis on financial reporting, and
thus result in larger realized gains or
smaller realized losses.

Lower inside ownership
increases the capital
market pressure and thus
increases the financial
reporting costs which in
turn reduces the
incentives for
underreporting income
for tax saving.

Table 2.4 (cont.)
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Mills (1998)
Mills and
Newberry
(2001)

Chan and Mo
(2002)

Major Results

Rationale for the results

Significance and
Implication

Public firms have higher nontax
financial-reporting costs than private
firms because the diffuse ownership
results in greater reliance on
compensation plans that use reported
book income. Public firm managers
are more likely to believe that
reported income determines the
market values of their firms.
Besides, accounting theory posits
that firms subject to greater
monitoring by lenders are more
likely to use income-increasing
accounting procedures.

Managers would choose
book-tax conforming or
book-tax different
reporting based on the
level of nontax costs
incurred for
underreporting profits.

Please refer to Table 2.3.
Empirical
study

5,776 firm-year
observations for
private and public
firms in US

Examine whether
financial-reporting costs
influence book-tax
conformity.

Public firms and firms with
higher debt levels are less
likely to have book-tax
conformity due to the
higher costs for reporting
low income.

Please refer to Table 2.3.
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Table 2.4 (cont.)
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory
Article

Methodology Sample

Objective of Study

Major Results

Rationale for the results

Smith (2002)

Analytical
study

N/A

Analyze the trade-off
between tax minimization
and managerial
performance evaluation.

The trade-off between tax
and performance evaluation
still exists for making
transfer pricing decisions by
multinational firms even if
the firms can (i) set separate
transfer prices for tax and
performance evaluation or
(ii) use a performance
measure other than profit
because of the audit risks.

Possibility of discovery of a second
price by tax authorities may lead to
penalties and additional tax audits
which would thus limit the value of
using separate prices for transfer
pricing. Besides, sophisticated
regulators could correctly infer that
income shifting motivates a firm’s
choice of an idiosyncratic, nonprofit-based compensation scheme
and thus decide to audit the firm
more closely.

Hodder et al.
(2003)

Empirical
study

6,622 private
Examine tax and nontax
commercial banks in factors that influence
US
commercial banks’
decision on conversion
from C-corporations to Scorporations.

Banks are more likely to
convert to S-corporations
when conversion saves
dividend taxes, avoids
alternative minimum taxes,
and minimizes state income
taxes. Banks are less likely
to convert when conversion
costs increase (i.e. when
banks have high demand of
capital but conversion
causes restricted access to
equity capital).

Given the tax benefits of being an Scorporation (i.e. no corporate tax),
one might expect that many banks
would convert from C-corporation to
S-corporation. However, there are
other tax costs (e.g. no losses
carryforwards, penalty taxes) and
nontax costs (e.g. limitation on
raising capital) which may also
affect the decisions.
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Significance and
Implication
Using separate transfer
prices for tax and
performance evaluation,
or using a performance
measure other than profit
cannot eliminate the taxincentive trade-off
because this would
increase the risks of being
audited by IRS and thus
increase the expected tax
costs.
Tax benefits, tax costs,
and nontax costs are
associated with banks’
choice of organizational
form.

Table 3.1
Sources of Foreign Direct Investment in China
Country

Hong Kong
US
Japan
Taiwan
Virgin Inlands
Singapore
Korea
UK

1979-1999
Value
% of China’s
(US$bn)
total FDI
154.8
50.3
25.65
8.3
24.89
8.1
23.86
7.8
9.40
3.1
14.82
4.8
8.84
2.9
7.58
2.5

Value
(US$bn)
15.5
4.38
2.92
2.30
3.83
2.17
1.49
1.16

2000
% of China’s
total FDI
38.1
10.8
7.2
5.6
9.4
5.3
3.7
2.8

Value
(US$bn)
16.71
4.43
4.35
2.98
5.04
2.14
2.15
1.05

2001
% of China’s
total FDI
35.6
9.5
9.3
6.4
10.8
4.6
4.6
2.2

Value
(US$bn)
17.86
5.42
4.19
3.97
6.12
2.34
2.72
0.90

2002
% of China’s
total FDI
33.9
10.3
7.9
7.5
11.6
4.4
5.2
1.7

Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2002, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.
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1979 - 2002
Value
% of China’s
(US$bn)
total FDI
204.88
45.7
39.89
8.9
36.34
8.1
33.11
7.4
24.39
5.4
21.47
4.8
15.20
3.4
10.70
2.4

Table 3.2
Distribution of Forms of Foreign Investment in China

Wholly-foreign
owned FIEs
Equity Joint
Ventures
Cooperative
Joint Venture
Others

1979-1999
2000
2001
2002
% of China’s total FDI % of China’s total FDI
% of China’s total FDI % of China’s total FDI
By value By number of By value By number of By value By number of By value By number
firms
firms
firms
of firms
29.53
27.87
47.31
54.58
62.14
59.84
60.15
64.89

1979 - 2002
% of China’s total FDI
By value By number
of firms
36.97
34.22

47.33

58.03

35.23

37.49

25.34

34.02

28.42

30.38

42.91

53.25

21.12

14.06

16.20

7.86

12.00

6.08

9.59

4.67

18.48

12.49

2.02

0.05

1.26

0.07

0.52

0.06

1.84

0.07

1.64

0.04

Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2002, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook . Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.
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Table 3.3
Annual Average of Renminbi Exchange Rates (US dollar to Renminbi)
Year
Spot
Exchange
Rates

1994
8.6187

1995
8.3510

1996
8.3142

1997
8.2898

1998
8.2791

1999
8.2783

2000
8.2784

2001
8.2770

Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2003. China Statistical Yearbook . Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.
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2002
8.2770

2003
8.2809

Table 4.1
Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Environmental Variables
1
Difference in income tax rates

2

Minimization of custom duties

3

Interest of local partners

4

Foreign exchange control and risks

5

Restrictions on profit repatriation

6

Risks of expropriation and nationalization

7

Good relationship with the Chinese
government
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Choice of Transfer Pricing Method
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a cost-based method
will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a cost-based method
will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a market-based
method will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a cost-based method
will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a cost-based method
will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a cost-based method
will be used
The more important this variable is perceived by
management, the more likely a market-based
method will be used

Table 4.2
Transfer Pricing Policies
Panel A: Transfer pricing methods

No. of FIEs
% of total
FIEs

Market-based mehods
Market
Adjusted
prices
market prices
10
28
16%

44%

Actual full
cost plus
9

Cost-based methods
Standard full Standard variable
cost plus
cost plus
16
1

14%

25%

1%

Panel B: Autonomy in external sourcing of materials or components

No. of FIE
% of total FIEs

Having autonomy
48
75%

Not having autonomy
16
25%

Panel C: Transfer pricing decisions and foreign equity share
Foreign equity share

Transfer pricing decisions
Decided by FIEs with consultation of foreign
partner’s parent company
Decided by FIEs without direct influence from
foreign partner’s parent company
Adopted the worldwide policies of the foreign
partner’s parent company

Over 50%

Not exceeding 50%

Total

26
8

15
6

41 (64%)
14 (22%)

9

0

9 (14%)

43

21

64 (100%)

Panel D: Disputes over transfer prices

No. of FIEs
% of total FIEs

Having disputes
10
16%

136

Not having disputes
54
84%

Table 4.3
The Importance of Environmental Variables Affecting International Transfer Pricing
All Sample FIEs

Variables
1
2
3
4

Difference in income tax rates
Minimization of custom duties
Interest of local partners
Foreign exchange control and
risks
5 Restrictions on profit
repatriation
6 Risks of expropriation and
nationalization
7 Good relationship with the
Chinese government

US FIEs in Sample Non-US FIEs in Sample

Mean

Ranking

Mean

Ranking

Mean

Ranking

2.70
3.03
2.98
3.02

2
5
3
4

2.91
3.09
3.09
2.68

3
4/5
4/5
2

2.59
3.00
2.93
3.19

1
4
3
5

3.75

6

3.55

6

3.86

6

4.31

7

4.32

7

4.30

7

2.64

1

2.59

1

2.67

2

Note: The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1 extremely important; 2 - very important; 3 - moderately important; 4 - not so
important; 5 - not important at all.
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Table 4.4
The Importance of Environmental Variables Perceived by Sample Firms Using
Different Transfer Pricing Methods

Environmental variables

Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var

FIEs Using
Market-based
Methods
Mean score

1
2
3
4
5
6

Difference in income tax rates
2.66
Minimization of custom duties
2.89
Interest of local partners
2.45
Foreign exchange control and risks
3.39
Restrictions on profit repatriation
3.71
Risk s of expropriation and
4.39
nationalization
Var 7 Good relationship with the
2.39
Chinese government
** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level.

FIEs Using
Cost-based
Methods
Mean score
2.77
3.23
3.77
2.46
3.80
4.19

Test of Significance of
Difference in Mean
Scores
Mann -Whitney
U (Z value)
0.11
0.98
3.34**
2.53**
0.55
0.43

3.00

Note: The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1 extremely important; 2 - very important; 3 - moderately important; 4 - not so
important; 5 - not important at all.
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1.68*

Table 4.5
Multivariate Analysis of Significance of Management Perception of the Importance of Environmental Variables
to the Choice of Transfer Pricing Methods
Independent Variables in logistic regression function

Predicted
Sign

Logistic regression analysis
Coefficient

Model
Var 1 Difference in income tax rates
Var 2 Minimization of custom duties
Var 3 Interest of local partners
Var 4 Foreign exchange control and risks
Var 5 Restrictions on profit repatriation
Var 6 Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Var 7 Good relationship with the Chinese government
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level

+
+
+
+
+
-

0.276
-0.175
-0.860
0.871
0.024
-0.044
-0.675

Chi -square
28.063
0.816
0.268
7.102
7.915
0.007
0.018
4.216

p-value
0.001***
0.366
0.605
0.008***
0.005***
0.935
0.892
0.040**

Note 1: The logit function is as follows:

Z = b0 + ∑ biVari
i

where: Z is the model score of logistic distribution (0 = cost-based, 1 = market-based),
bi is the model coefficient for the independent variables ( i.e. the seven environmental variables).
Note 2: Based on the logit function, 65.38% of FIEs using cost-based methods and 86.84% of FIEs using
market-based methods are correctly classified.
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Table 4.6
Sensitivity Test 1 – By Adding a Dummy Variable Signifying a Majority or Minority
Foreign Shareholding
Original model
New model
Regression
Regression
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Var 1. Difference in income tax rates

0.276

0.366

0.290

0.347

Var 2. Minimization of custom duties
Var 3. Interest of local partners
Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks

-0.175
-0.860
0.871

0.605
0.008*
0.005*

-0.179
-0.909
0.872

0.596
0.008*
0.005*

Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation
Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese
government

0.024
-0.044

0.935
0.892

0.041
-0.010

0.892
0.975

-0.675

0.040*

-0.698

0.038*

Newly added variable:
Majority or minority foreign shareholding
* Significant at the 5% level

0.370
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0.647

Table 4.7
Sensitivity Test 2 – By Adding Percentage of Foreign Ownership as Variable
Original model
New model
Regression
Regression
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
0.276
0.366
0.115
0.721

Var 1. Difference in income tax rates
Var 2. Minimization of custom duties
Var 3. Interest of local partners

-0.175
-0.860

0.605
0.008*

-0.230
-0.332

0.519
0.430

Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks
Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation

0.871
0.024

0.005*
0.935

1.050
0.038

0.004*
0.903

Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese
government

-0.044

0.892

-0.205

0.556

-0.675

0.040*

-0.871

0.021*

-5.340

0.067

Newly added variable:
Percentage of foreign ownership
* Significant at the 5% level
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Table 4.8
Sensitivity Test 3 - By Adding a Variable Signifying Whether the FIEs Set Their
Transfer Pricing Policies with Consultation of Parent Companies
Original model
New model
Regression
Regression
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Var 1. Difference in income tax rates

0.276

0.366

0.265

0.387

Var 2. Minimization of custom duties

-0.175

0.605

-0.199

0.562

Var 3. Interest of local partners

-0.860

0.008*

-0.879

0.007*

Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks

0.871

0.005*

0.872

0.005*

Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation

0.024

0.935

0.039

0.896

-0.044

0.892

-0.008

0.980

-0.675

0.040*

-0.691

0.037*

0.487

0.572

Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese
government
Newly added variable:
Consultation
* Significant at the 5% level
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Table 5.1
Comparative Tax and Nontax Costs of Shifting Profits out of China through International Transfer Pricing

Form of Investment
Wholly foreign-owned FIEs and
cooperative joint ventures (compared
with equity joint ventures)
Activity Orientation
Export-oriented FIEs (compared
with domestic-market-oriented
enterprise)
Nationality
Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced FIEs
(compared with other-sourced FIEs)

Audit Costs

Probability of
Being
Audited

More motivated to
evade

Similar

Higher

Lower

More motivated to
evade

Lower/ Similar

Higher

Lower

More motivated to
evade

Lower/ Similar

Higher

Tax Cost

Nontax Costs

Similar

Lower

Lower

Lower
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Incentive to
Evade

Table 5.2
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Sample FIEs

Variables

Policy variables:
FORM

Category

Audited Sample
(n = 111)
No. of
Percentage
Firms
of the Sample

Non-audited Sample
(n = 194)
No. of
Percentage
Firms
of the Sample

Wholly foreign-owned enterprise and
cooperative joint venture
Equity joint venture

96
15

86.5%
13.5%

117
77

60.3%
39.7%

ACTIVITY

Export -oriented enterprise
Domestic-market-oriented enterprise

101
10

91.0%
9.0%

67
127

34.5%
65.5%

SOURCE

Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced FIEs
Others

92
19

82.9%
17.1%

124
70

63.9%
36.1%

Univariate Tests

Chisquare test

t-test

22.967 ***

90.949 ***

12.289 ***
Control variables:

INDUSTRY

Identified industries
Others

38
73

34.2%
65.8%

111

Mean
25.4. .

35
159

18.0%
82.0%

194

Mean
50.4 ..

10.169 ***
SIZE

Sales in US$million

ROC

Return on capital (i.e. net profit before
tax over capital)

7.659 ***
111

11.2%

194

22.9%
1.367

RPT

Volume of related-party transaction
over sales

111

1.34.

194

0.91
-4.569 ***

Chi-square test and t-test compare the sample distribution and means between audited sample and non-audited sample.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.

144

Table 5.3
Regression Results on the Impact of Firm Characteristics on Transfer Pricing Compliance
Regression equation:
AUDIT = α0 +α 1 FORM +α2 ACTIVITY +α3 SOURCE +α4 INDUSTRY +α5 SIZE +α6 ROC
+α7 RPT+ ε
Variable

Intercept
FORM
ACTIVITY
SOURCE
INDUSTRY
SIZE
ROC
RPT
Chi-square for Model
Percentage Correctly Classified

Predicted Sign

Regression
Coefficient

Wald
?2

7.015
-0.856
2.607
-0.353
0.082
-1.066
0.211
1.103

+
+
+
+

3.267
30.990
0.664
0.039
41.892
0.901
8.878

Significance
(p-value)

0.036
0.000
0.208
0.422
0.000
0.172
0.002

200.795***
87.2

***, ** indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent levels, respectively.
Definitions of variables:
AUDIT
= 1, if an FIE was audited by the Chinese tax authorities due to transfer pricing
manipulation, 0 otherwise;
FORM
= 1, if an FIE is a equity joint venture, 0 otherwise;
ACTIVITY = 1, if an FIE is an export -oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise;
SOURCE
= 1, if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan, 0 otherwise.
INDUSTRY = 1, if an FIE is in identified higher risk industries, 0 otherwise;
SIZE
= natural logarithm of sales
ROC
= return on capital of FIE (i.e. profit before tax over capital)
RPT
= volume of related-party transactions over sales
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**
***

***
***
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